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I. INTRODUCTION

It is an autumn day in 1994, and I am sitting around the big table at the
West Virginia State Bar office. The chairs are filled with adoption specialists from
many disciplines, each with their own perspective of what is right and what is
wrong with West Virginia's adoption statutes. We are meeting under the auspices
of the West Virginia Law Institute' to determine how to reform the law so that it
serves the best interests of children, while striking the proper balance between the
rights and needs of birth and adoptive parents. I am one of two professors whose
presumed role in the process is "family law expert." As a relative newcomer to this
role,2 I clothe myself in the persona of the academic. I provide information about
West Virginia's current law, about what other states are doing, and about the
Uniform Adoption Act, which was then under consideration by the National
Conference of Commissioners on State Laws. I pose questions designed to elicit all
points of view.
I do not say, "And, oh by the way, I am an adult adoptee."
I don't announce my legal status, in part, because I feel that I might
jeopardize my role as neutral facilitator, and, in part, because it seems that as a
child adopted at an early age by a step-parent, my experience is different from the
presumed traditional adoptee experience. Under the presumably typical model,
adoption is a legal process that occurs when a birth parent places her newborn
infant with an agency or individual for eventual adoption by individuals unrelated
and unknown to her. All contact with the biological family is severed by the
adoption process under this traditional model.
As a step-parent adoptee, I fall outside of this model. I still have a
biological connection through my mother, and I have extended family through
whom I can learn more about my birth father who died when I was a little over a
year old.
As I learn more about adoption, I discover that my experience is not the
exception; that in fact, placing a healthy newborn with an unrelated adoptive parent
occurs in a minority of the adoption cases.3 Most adoptions involve children
1
The West Virginia Law Institute ["Institute" or "WVLI"] is a statutorily created body that serves
"as an official advisory law revision and law reform agency of the state of West Virginia... located at the
West Virginia University college of law." W. VA. CODE § 4-12-1 (1999). The Institute has no authority to
enact legislation on its own. Its governing body is comprised of members of the state and federal judiciary,
counsel from the state's executive branch, members of the West Virginia Legislature and its staff, members
and officers of the state bar, and the dean, selected students and professors of the college of law. W. VA.
CODE § 4-12-3 (1999).
2
At the time of these discussions, I was beginning my third year offull-time teaching.

In 1994, the National Conference of Commissioners on State Laws reported that "[i]n recent years,
no more than 25-30% of all adoptions involve infants adopted by unrelated adults." See UNIF. ADOPTION
ACT, Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 13 (1999).
3
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forming relationships with parental figures who have some legal or biological
relationship with one of the child's birth parents.4 Still other adoptions involve
children, of various ages, Who have been removed from their birth parents by the
state.'
Even among infant adoptions, the traditional model is not always followed.
Some birth parents help to select the adoptive homes of their children and continue
to remain available to their children even after the legal adoption has been
finalized.' Some infant adoptions occur through new reproductive technologies that
There is no current public or private data base for national adoption statistics. The most recent
complete picture of adoption in the United States was produced by the National Center for State Courts in
Williamsburg, Virginia in a study authored by Victor and Carol Flango. Their study reviewed court records,
bureau of vital statistics records and records of social service agencies. VICTOR FLANGO & CAROL FLANGO,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE FLOW OF ADOPTION INFORMATION FROM THE STATES (1994)
[hereinafter FLANGo AND FLANGO REPORT.]

According to the Flango and Flango Report, during the 1990's, approximately 120,000 children
were adopted each year. In 1992, 15.5% of these adoptions involved placement by public agencies. Public
agency adoptions refer to placements by public, government-operated agencies or by private agencies under
contracts with government agencies. Another 37.5% of the adoptions resulted from independent or nonagency adoptions. These adoptions may involve a licensed or unlicensed facilitator, certified medical doctor,
member ofthe clergy, or attomey. Id.
Another growing form of adoption involves intercountry or international placements. In 1992,
there were 6,536 international adoptees brought to the United States. By 1998, that number had increased to
15,774. The largest number of these international adoptees came from Russia. National Adoption Information
Clearinghouse, Intercountry Statistics (visited June 17, 1999) <http:llwww.calib.comlnaicladptsearl adoption
/research/statslintercountry.htm> (relying upon Immigration and Naturalization Service, Demographic
Statistics Branch, Statistics Division).
4
According to the West Virginia Division of Vital Statistics and the Department of Health and
Human Resources, almost three-fourths of all adoptions in West Virginia in 1994 were related adoptions, i.e.,
adoptions wherein birth parents and adoptive parents are related by birth or marriage. Interview by Heidi
Kossuth, Institute Reporter. Nationally, over half of the 130,000 or more adoptions that take place each year,
more than 50% are adoptions by step-parents or relatives. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, Prefatory Note, 9
U.L.A. 13 (1999). According to the Flango and Flango Report, 42% of completed adoptions in 1992 were
either kinship or step-parent adoptions. FLANGO AND FLANGO, supranote 4.
An estimated 15-20% of all adoptions nationally involve children who are being adopted out of
foster care. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 13 (1999). According to the Adoption and Foster
Care Analysis and Reporting System of the United States Department of Health and Human Resources 1999
projections, there are approximately 520,000 children currently in foster care in the United States, 110,000 of
whom are available for adoption. In 1997, 31,000 children were adopted from foster care. National Adoption
Information Clearinghouse, Adoptions From Foster Care (visited June 17, 1999) <http'/www.calib.com/
naicladptsear/ adoption/research/stats/foster1999.htm> (relying upon United States Health and Human
Services data.)
In West Virginia, for fiscal year 1998, an estimated 187 adoptions took place out of foster care.
Adoptions Up in 1998: ASFA PlaysKey Role, Vol. 18 No. 3 A.B.A CHILD L. PRACT. 2 (1999).
6
For a book explaining the growth of the open adoption movement, its benefits to all members of
the adoption triad, and the process of parenting children through open adoption, see BRUCE M. RAPPAPORT,
THE OPEN ADOPTION BOOK: A GUIDE TO MAKING ADOPTION WORK FOR YOU (1992). The current legal
status of open adoption is catalogued in Annette Ruth Appell, The Move Toward Legally Sanctioned
Cooperative Adoption: Can It Survive The Uniform Adoption Act? 30 FAM. L.Q. 483, 488489 (1996).
According to a 1991 study of open'adoptions, in 69% of public and private agency adoptions, the birth

parents had met the adoptive couple. MARIANNE BERRY, Risks and Benefits of Open Adoptions, 3(1) THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN 125-138 (1993). Another study of agency adoptions revealed the growing popularity of
open adoptions. While only 35% of the agencies studied offered fully disclosed adoptions between 1987 and
1989, by 1993, the percentage had grown to 76%. RUTH G. McRoY, OPENNESS IN ADOPTION: EXPLORING
FAMILY CONNECTIONS (1998).
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continue to evolve even as this article goes to press such as artificial insemination,7
surrogacy, S and egg donation. 9 Even cloning stands as a possibility in the not too
distant future.10
How do we craft a law that meets the needs of all of these adoption
contexts without overly complicating the proceedings or the statute itself? How do
we meet the competing visions of what adoption is and should be? These would be
the challenges facing the Institute and, later, the West Virginia Legislature.
Through sperm donation, a biological mother can influence the physical characteristics, even the
gender, of her child. Recent advances in reproductive technology have produced an 93% accuracy rate for
those opting to have a female child and a 73% predictability rate for a male child. See Lisa Belkin, Getting the
Girl, THE N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1999 (Magazine) at 26; Frederic Golden, Boy? Girl? Up to You, TIME, Sept.
21, 1998, at 82.
8
The case of In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), holding a surrogacy contract invalid,
7

focused the nation's attention on surrogate motherhood. The characters from this drama continue to attract
media interest. See Jim Puzzanghera, Unhappy Surrrogate L.L Mom Wants to Live Closer to Baby M.,
NEWSDAY, Dec. 13, 1997 at 19. The enforceability of surrogacy contracts continues to generate controversy
among legal scholars. See e.g., MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988); Lori B. Andrews,
Beyond DoctrinalBoundaries:A Legal Frameworkfor Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343 (1995);
Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challengefor Feminists, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 72
(1988); Katharine A. Bartlett, Re-expressing Parenthood,98 YALE L.J. 292 (1988); Margaret Friedlander
Brinig, A MaterialisticApproach to Surrogacy: Comment on RichardEpstein's Surrogacy: The Casefor Full
ContractualEnforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2377 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full
ContractualEnforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305 (1995); Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of
Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 21 (1989); Golnar
Modjtahedi, Note and Comment, Nobody's Child: Enforcing Surrogacy Contracts,20 WHITTIER L. REV. 243
(1998).
9
The ethics of the new reproductive technologies have triggered debate within the worldwide
community of scholars interested in family law, inheritance, race, and medical ethics. See, e.g, DOROTHY
ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE REPRODUCTION AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997);
CARSON STRONG, ETHICS INREPRODUCTIVE AND PERINATAL MEDICINE: A NEW FRAMEWORK (1997); Lori
B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Adoption, Reproductive Technologies, and Genetic Information, 8 HEALTH
MATRIX 125 (1998); James E. Bailey, An Analytical Frameworkfor Resolving the Issues Raised by the
InteractionBetween Reproductive Technologies and the Law of Inheritance,47 DEPAUL L. REV. 743 (1998);
Janet L. Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus: Reproductive Technology and the Law, 23 VT. L. REV. 225 (1998);
Heidi Forster, The Legal and Ethical Debate Surrounding the Storage and Destruction of Frozen Human
Embryos: A Reaction to the Mass Disposal in Britain and the Lack of Law in the United States, 76 WASH. U.
L.Q. 759 (1998).
10
Scottish scientists' successful cloning of the sheep, Dolly, in 1996, followed by Japanese
biologists' claims in 1998 to have used a cloning technique to produce eight identical calves, has unleashed a
furious debate about the possibilities and ethics of human cloning. In 1997, President Clinton urged a
moratorium on research into the area of human cloning. Nevertheless, in 1998, American scientist, Richard
Seed announced that he and several other Chicago-area scientists planned to begin work on a human cloning
project which he hoped would evolve into creating yet another avenue of opportunity for infertile couples.
See ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 6, 1998) (interview can be found at National Public
Radio, Human Cloning Plans (visited July 4, 1999) <www.npr.org/news /health/ 980106.cloning.html>. For
books and articles exploring the questions raised by this new technology as applied to humans, see LORI B.
ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE: ADVENTURES IN THE NEW WORLD OF REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES (1999); Lori B. Andrews, Is there a Right to Clone? ConstitutionalChallengesto Bans on
Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643 (1998); Judith F. Daar, The Future of Human Cloning:
PrescientLessons from Medical Ethics Past, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 167 (1998); Michael A. Goldman,
Human Cloning: Science Fact and Fiction, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 103 (1998); Charlene Kalebic, The
Constitutional Question of Cloning Humans: Duplication or Procreation? An Examination of the
ConstitutionalRight to Procreate,8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 229 (1998); M. Cathleen Kaveny, Cloning and
Positive Liberty, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 15 (1999).
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During the fall 1996 interim legislative session, the Institute did propose
amendments to West Virginia's adoption law.11 Tactical decisions had been made
to address certain issues and leave others for another day. In resolving the issues
that were addressed, compromises had to be made to accommodate the competing
views of the members of the Advisory Committee and the Institute.
Finally, during the 1997 legislative session, the West Virginia Legislature
did pass amendments to reform the state's adoption process. It too made
compromises to satisfy certain constituency groups and to resolve the different
perspectives of the delegates and senators who considered and voted on the bill. In
statute, some were
the end, some of the Institute's provisions remained in the
12
floor.
room
cutting
legislative
the
to
fell
some
and
modified,
More than two years have passed since the Legislature reformed West
Virginia's adoption statute. The goal of this article is to provide a kind of
legislative history to deepen the reader's understanding of the current statute. This
history will include an explanation of the West Virginia Law Institute's Proposal,
as well as the Legislature's reaction to it. In Part II, I will detail this history. In Part
III, I will explain the operation of the current statute, with mention of the few
recent adoption decisions that have construed various provisions. In Part IV, I will
look at some of the problems caused by the hurried redraft of certain portions of the
statute in the closing hours of the 1997 legislative session.
By way of coming attractions, I plan to make this the first in a trilogy of
articles. The second article will be published in the West Virginia Law Review's
Spring Symposium issue, FamilyLaw in the Year 2000. In this second article, I will
examine the constitutional rights of non-marital fathers in the context of the new
statute in order to determine whether the current statute as enacted passes
constitutional muster.1 3 In the third article, I will look at some of the issues that
both the Institute and the Legislature ducked in the most recent round of reforms.
By the end of this trilogy, I hope that we will have a better understanding of the
current law, as well as a road map for future reforms, both immediate and longterm.
II. THE JOURNEY TO WEST VIRGINIA'S CURRENT ADOPTION STATUTE
A.

The Pre-1997 West VirginiaAdoption Statute

Adoptions are governed by Article 4 of Chapter 48 of the West Virginia
Code. Compared to some state statutes governing adoption, the pre-1997 adoption
11

The author has on file all preliminary, final drafts, and amendments to the West Virginia Law
Institute's Proposal to Amend Chapter 48, Article 4 of the West Virginia Code.
For a comparison of the Pre-1997 statute with the Institute's proposal and the final adoption Act
12
enacted signed into law in 1997, see the Table at the conclusion of Part I infra.
See Lisa Kelly, Is West Virginia'sAdoption Statute Constitutionalin Its Treatment of Nonmarital
13
Fathers?: Yes, No, Maybe So, 102 W. VA. L. REv. (forthcoming Sept. 2000).
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statute took a minimalist approach. 14 For instance, nothing in the statute regulated
the actual placement of children in adoptive families. The home study, or "discreet
inquiry" as it is referred to in the West Virginia statute, was to be accomplished
after the filing of the adoption petition and before the final hearing.15 Since,
typically, the adoption petition was not filed until between twenty to thirty days
prior to the final hearing, 16 often the home study was performed after the child had
lived with the family for as long as five months.
No specific qualifications were imposed upon the person who was to
perform the discreet inquiry. The statute required only that it be performed by "any
suitable and discreet person not related to either the persons previously entitled to
parental rights or the adoptive parents. 17 Whether these discreet inquiries were
conducted at all was discretionary with the court, and the statute set forth no criteria
to guide the exercise of that discretion. 8
Under the pre-1997 Act, only the biological mother and the legal or
determined father of the child were required to either give consent or have their
rights terminated in order for an adoption to proceed.1 9 Legal fathers were those
who were married to the child's mother at the time of the child's birth or
conception or who subsequently married the mother after the birth of their child.2"
The determined father was a man in whom paternity had been judicially established
prior to the adoption.2 1 Putative fathers, i.e., those biological fathers in whom
paternity had never been judicially established, were not required to provide their
consent to a child's adoption under the pre-1997 Act.
The procedure to be followed in executing consents or relinquishments z2
14

For instance, the New York statute in place at the time comprised nearly two hundred annotated

pages in the New York statutes compared to West Virginia's approximately twenty pages. See N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW §§ 109-117 (McKinney 1999); W. VA. CODE §§ 8-4-1 - 16 (1996) (amended 1997). Illinois
statutes devoted at least 150 pages to adoption. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/0.01-50/24 (West 1999).
The Uniform Adoption Act contains over 115 separate provisions, UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, Table of Contents,
in comparison to West Virginia's statute, which still remains lean at only twenty-one sections, even after its
amendment in 1997. W. VA. CODE §§ 48-4-1 -16 (1999).
15
W. VA. CODE § 48-4-9(b) (1996) (amended 1997).
16

The pre-1997 West Virginia statute did not provide for when the adoption petition should be filed.

It did provide that those entitled to notice would be served within twenty to thirty days of the final hearing,
depending upon the form of service, W. VA. CODE § 48-4-8 (1996) (amended 1997) and that the final hearing

could not occur until the child had resided in the adoptive home for a period of six months. W. VA. CODE §
48-4-9(a) (1996) (amended 1997).
17
W. VA. CODE § 48-4-9(b) (1996) (amended 1997).
18

Id.

19

W. VA. CODE § 48-4-3 (1996) (amended 1997). An adoptee over the age of twelve at the time of

the adoption was also required to consent. Id.
20

W. VA. CODE § 48-4-1 (1996) (amended 1997).

21

Id.

2

Neither "consent" nor "relinquishment" was defined by the pre-1997 statute, although both terms

were used throughout. A consent refers to the birth parent's placement of a child with a particular individual
for the purpose of that individual's adoption of the child. By contrast, a relinquishment refers to a birth
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was also largely ungoverned by the West Virginia statute pre-1997. As long as the
birth parents signed the consent or relinquishment seventy-two hours or more after
the birth of the child in question, that consent was irrevocable absent fraud or
duress.2 Although the statute did require that certain language be included in the
irrevocable consent form,24 the statute was silent as to what counseling, if any, the
birth parent should undergo prior to signing the consent, who could draft or execute
the consent, and what procedure should be followed in obtaining the birth parent's
consent.
As with most adoption statutes, if those birth parents with recognized
parental rights failed or refused to give their consent, the adoption could proceed
only if those parental rights were terminated.25 Often, the termination hearing took
place at the same time as the final adoption hearing. Again, by that time, the child
would have resided with the adoptive parents for at least six months.
"Abandonment," the most frequently used basis for terminating parental
rights under Chapter 48, was nowhere defined in the statute. Attorneys throughout
the state complained bitterly that, in some jurisdictions, judges refused to allow
adoptions in cases where children received little more than birthday cards from
absent parents year after year.26 The common law definition of abandonment
required the court to find that the absent parent had exhibited "conduct... [that
evinced] a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child."27 With no temporal scope attached to this definition, and a lack
of specificity as to the types of conduct that would evince such a settled purpose,
practitioners complained that termination decisions were riddled with
unpredictability.
A more general, and ambiguous category of individuals was required to
receive notice of the adoption under the pre-1997 statute. Under 48-4-8, notice of
parent's agreement to place the child with an agency that will in turn, place the child for adoption. This
distinction is made clear in the definitions section of the new statute. See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-1(g), (n)
(1999).
23
W. VA. CODE § 48-4-5(a) (1996) (amended 1997). For cases in which a birth parent sought to
revoke her consent based upon fraud or duress, see Wooten v. Wallace, 351 S.E2d 72 (W. Va. 1987) (finding
no duress where mother's personal circumstances, as opposed to the unconscionable act of another, induced
her to sign consent to adopt); Rich v. Rich, 364 S.E.2d 804 (W. Va. 1987) (finding that where adoptive father
later seeks to revoke birth father's consent, in order to avoid a child support obligation on the basis of his own
fraud in the transaction, revocation will be denied); Baby Boy R. v. Velas, 386 S.E.2d 839 (W. Va. 1989)
(denying revocation where mother was presented with a temporary foster care agreement the day after the
child was born and the voluntary relinquishment three days later, mother claimed not to understand what she
was signing and sought to revoke within a month after signing).
24
W. VA. CODE § 48-4-5(a)(3) (1996) (amended 1997).
25

W. VA. CODE § 484-3 (1996) (amended 1997).

26

At the outset of the Institute's work on the Adoption Reform Project, Heidi Kossuth, the first

reporter for the project, solicited practitioner input in an article in the WEST VIRGINIA LAWYER. The most
frequent complaint dealt with the lack of specificity in the common law abandonment definition. Letters from
family law practitioners in West Virginia, to Heidi Kossuth, Reporter, West Virginia Law Institute Adoption
Reform Project (1994-1995) (on file with author).
27
In re Adoption of Schoffstall, 368 S.E.2d 720, 722 (W. Va. 1988) (quoted in In re Adoption of
Mullins, 421 S.E.2d 680, 682 (W. Va. 1992)).
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the adoption proceedings was to be served upon "any known person entitled to
parental rights of a child prior to its adoption who has not signed either a consent
for the adoption of the child or a relinquishment of custody of such child, or whose
parental rights have not otherwise been terminated." 28 The right to notice could be
waived if proper language was used. 29 The ambiguity of this section was imbedded
in the central language of "person entitled to parental rights."30 No definition was
provided to inform the practitioner of who fell into this category of persons entitled
to parental rights.
The West Virginia statute did not address the ramifications of any of the
new reproductive technologies on the adoption process. One brief reference to
surrogacy contracts could be found in the exceptions to the prohibitions against the
purchase or sale of a child, 31 but surrogacy contracts were not defined or regulated
in the Code. Typically, a surrogacy contract involves an agreement between
prospective adoptive parents and a birth mother who agrees to conceive a child
with the intention of placing the child with the adoptive parents. The genetic
material for the child may be in whole, in part, or not at all the product of the
prospective adoptive parents.32
West Virginia's apparent approval of surrogacy contracts stood in
contradiction to its consent and relinquishment provisions by prohibiting the
execution of consents to adopt prior to the expiration of seventy-two hours after the
birth of the child to be adopted. 3 The surrogacy provision also appeared ambiguous
in light of another statutory section that voided all contracts which sought "to alter
the time or manner of adoption as provided in this article."' If a surrogacy contract
was based upon contracting for adoption prior to the seventy-two hour post-birth
period for consent, could it survive as a matter of public policy?
Not only did the pre-1997 statute raise concerns about the subjects that it
did not address; it also caused alarm over the way that certain other subjects were
handled. Most prominent among these concerns was the lack of finality of
28

W. VA. CODE § 48-4-8(a) (1996) (amended 1997).

29

The actual language, which remains in the statute today, is that the waiver must be by "a writing

acknowledged as in the case of deeds or by other proper means." Id This language was found offensive,
particularly by the adult adoptees on the West Virginia Law Institute Advisory Committee, because it likens
children in the adoption proceeding to transferable property.
30
Id.
31

W. VA. CODE § 48-4-16(e)(3) (1996) (amended 1997) provided:
(e) This section does not prohibit the payment or receipt of the following:
(3) Fees and expenses included in any agreement in which a woman agrees to
become a surrogate mother.

32

See Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 623, 669-

678 (1991).
33
See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-5(a) (1996) (amended 1997).

34

See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-15 (1996) (amended 1997).
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adoptions that the West Virginia statute created. The pre-1997 statute allowed for
the vacation of an adoption by any person "not served with notice as provided in
said provisions . . .at any time within one year after learning of or having
reasonable opportunity to learn of the adoption. ' 3s This provision, when combined
with the ill-defined contours of the provision setting forth who was required to
receive notice, as discussed above, left some adoptive families in perpetual limbo.
In particular, the provision struck fear into the hearts of adoptive families created
under circumstances in which the child's birth father could not be found. 6 The
indeterminate period of time from which the one year was to run meant that there
might never be finality in such adoptions. Not only did consideration need to be
given to achieving meaningful finality, but the whole issue of how to handle
adoptions when the mother contends that the father is unknown required more
attention than the pre-1997 statute gave it.
Yet another matter about the existing statute caused considerable debate.
The irrevocability of consents and relinquishments entered into after only seventytwo hours of the child's birth37 long had seemed very harsh to many birth parent
advocates. Should a new mother or father have some period of time after the
signing of a consent to change her or his mind? If so, what should that time period
be? West Virginia was clearly in the minority in its refusal to give birth parents any
opportunity to change their minds after the seventy-two hour window.38
35

W. VA. CODE § 48-4-12 (1996) (amended 1997).

3

In infant adoptions, practitioners reported that it was not at all uncommon for birth fathers to be

listed as unknown. Discussions with Advisory Committee members, WVLI Adoption Reform Project.
37

W. VA. CODE § 484-5(a) (1996) (amended 1997).

3

Many states prescribe a period following the execution of the consent or relinquishment during

which revocation may occur without adjudication. See, e.g., ARK.CODE ANN. § 9-9-209 (Michie 1998) (ten
days); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8814.5(a) (Deering Supp. 1999) (ninety days); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-9(b) (1999)
(ten days); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-14-3(a) (Michie 1997) (until entry of final adoption decree); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 600A.4 (West 1996) (allows revocation within ninety-six hours of execution); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 199.500(5) (Michie 1998) (twenty days); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24 6a. (West Supp. 2000)(ten working
days); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-608(a) (Supp. 1998) (allows twenty-one days or seven days, depending upon
the age of the child); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-1-112 (1996) (ten days); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-220.2 (Michie
Supp. 1999) (fifteen or twenty-five days of execution, depending upon age of child); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.33.160(2) (West 1997) (consent revocable until court approves the consent).

Other states provide a period during which a petition for revocation may be filed to be adjudicated
by the court using "the best interest of the child standard," see, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:10.
(Supp. 1998) (issue must be raised prior to the final decree); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115 (McKinney 1999)
(issue must be raised within forty-five days after execution and, if objected to, decided under best interests
standard); N.D. CENT CODE § 14-15-08 (2) (1997) (issue must be raised before the final order); Oio REv.
CODE ANN. § 3107.084 (Anderson 1996) (issue must be raised prior to final decree).
Some states do a combination of both, allowing unconditional revocation for a prescribed period,
but requiring adjudication of the child's interest if the time for unconditional revocation has passed, see, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.070 (Michie 1998) (consent may be withdrawn before the entry of the adoption
decree, for any reason within ten days after consent is executed, or after the ten-day period, if the court finds

withdrawal to be in the child's best interest); HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-2 (f) (1993) (consent cannot be
withdrawn after child is placed with prospective adoptive parents, unless the court finds that it would be in
the best interests of the adoptee).

States following West Virginia's position include: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106(D.) (West
Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. 42-2417 (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN.

REv. STAT. § 109.312 (b) (1997).

§§

32A-5-21(A)(7)(Michie 1999); OR.
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Many adoption attorneys also felt discomfort with the provisions that
criminalized the purchase or sale of a child, while at the same time permitting
"reasonable and customary legal, medical, hospital or other expenses incurred in
connection with legal adoption proceedings. 39 Was it "reasonable and customary,"
for example, to give money to an indigent pregnant woman so that she could pay
her utility bills, thereby increasing her chances of a healthy pregnancy, as she
considered whether to place her unborn child for adoption? Or would such an act be
felonious? Those engaged in arranging adoptions yearned for clarity as to what
was and was not permissible.
Finally, West Virginia's adoption statute was based upon the traditional
model of closed adoptions. This model has been called the "as if' model of
adoption,41 where everything is done to create the adoptive family in the image of
the ideal biological family. In the most extreme versions of this model, agencies
attempt to engineer placements to match children by body-build, hair and eye color
to their adoptive families. 42 After the adoptive family is finalized, it is as if the
biological family never existed.
West Virginia followed this closed model of adoption. The child's birth
certificate is changed to reflect that he or she was bom to the adoptive family; his
or her actual birth records are sealed, as are the adoption proceedings themselves;
and the birth family ceases to have any contact with, or legal obligation to, their
biological child. Inheritance passes from and to the adoptive family, and the child is
no longer able to benefit from his or her birth family's estate. " The presumed
secrecy of the proceedings was even reflected in the terminology of a "discreet
inquiry" by "any suitable and discreet person. '
4
Only the existence of the West Virginia Voluntary Adoption Registry 6
("Registry") served the needs of adoptees and birth parents who sought to learn
more about each other. The Registry provided a clearinghouse for birth parents and
adult adoptees to register their willingness to release identifying information to

39

W. VA. CODE § 48-4-16(e)(2) (1996) (amended 1997).

40

Under W. VA. CODE § 48-4-16(a)-(c) (1996) (amended 1997), any person guilty of knowingly

offering, giving or agreeing to give, and any person guilty of knowingly receiving or accepting an offer of

money, property, service or other thing of value in consideration for locating, providing or procuring a child
for adoption, has committed a felony punishable by one to five years and/or fined $100.00 to $2,000.00.
A recent provocative film directed by Jodie Foster illuminated the class issues that surround

adoption. See THE BABY DANCE (Showtime Network, Inc., 1998).
41

ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF PARENTING 53-57

(1993).
42

Id.

43

W. VA. CODE § 48-4-10 (1996) (amended 1997).

44

W. VA. CODE § 48-4-11 (1996) (amended 1997).

45

W. VA. CODE § 48-4-9(b) (1996) (amended 1997).

46

W. VA. CODE § 48-4A-1, et seq. (1996) (amended 1997).
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each other4 However, nothing in the adoption procedure itself served to make the
birth parents aware of its existence, and no appropriations were provided to
maintain it. Instead, the Registry was to be supported by the user's fees charged to
those who sought out its services. 4
Obviously, the Registry did not open the closed adoption process. It only
provided a mechanism for some adoptees and birth parents to find out about each
other and, even then, only after the adoptee had reached the age of majority. There
had been much debate in the adoption community about whether more steps should
be taken to open up the process at least for future adoptions. 9
For all of these reasons, it was time to revisit West Virginia's adoption
statute.
B.

The West VirginiaLaw Institute Steps In
1.

The History of the West Virginia Law Institute's Adoption
Reform Project

In September of 1993, the West Virginia Law Institute held a multidisciplinary, statewide conference to identify legal issues impacting children and
families in West Virginia. The purpose of the conference was first to brainstorm
and then to select an area in which the Institute could make a difference by
proposing statutory reform.
Several issues were identified as a result of the Institute's conference5 0
47

W. VA. CODE § 48-4A-1 (1996) (amended 1997).

48

W. VA. CODE § 48-4A-8(j) (1996) (amended 1997).

49
Books advocating greater openness in adoption proceedings include RUTH G. McRoy Er AL.,
OPENNESS INADOPTION: NEW PRACInCES, NEW ISSUES (1988); Lois RusKAI MELINA & SHARON KAPLAN
ROszL4, THE OPEN ADoPTION EXPERIENCE (1993). Among the many law review articles advocating the same
are Tammy M. Somogye, Comment, OpeningMinds to Open Adoption, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 619 (Mar. 1997);
Appell, supranote 7 at 488-489.
so
During the morning of the day-long conference, held on September 17, 1993, five working groups
brain-stormed about the need for reform in the following areas: child support; juvenile justice; child abuse
and neglect; adoption and surrogacy; and custody and visitation. Each group reported to the whole in a
plenary session.
The majority of the afternoon was spent discussing the need for restructuring the fragmented
family court system in West Virginia. Jeffrey A. Kuhn of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges made a presentation of model unified court systems and facilitated discussion among the body as a
whole. Notes and Conference materials on file with author and with organizer of the conference.
In addition to adoption, many other issues that surfaced during the conference have become the
subject of recent legislative and constitutional amendment initiatives. Most notably, an effort was made to
amend the West Virginia Constitution in order to facilitate the creation of a family court system in the fall of
1998. See Phil Kabler, Senate Stalls Lobbyists' Effort to Get Tax-Exempt Status, CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
March 11, 1998, at 2A; Judges MayAsk Statefor More of Their Own, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 16, 1998,
at 5A. This effort to amend the constitution failed. See Maryclaire Dale, Committee Urges Creation ofFamily
Courts, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, December 2, 1998, at IC. However, some small steps toward court
reorganization were taken with legislation signed by Governor Underwood in the summer of 1999.
Establishing mediation as an integral part of resolving family law disputes was also a part of this recent
legislative effort. Unfortunately, however, no funding was provided to train or compensate the required
mediators.
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However, the law pertaining to adoption was one important area affecting children
and families that did not already have an identified constituency advocating for its
reform. Unlike some of the other needs, for example the creation of a unified
family court system, that would have required the Legislature to appropriate funds
and to wrangle with the power of established political forces, adoption reform
seemed to be a project that would not require additional state funds or bump up
against anyone's political bailiwick.
Additionally, adoption seemed ripe for reform. The facts in the In Re Baby
Jessica5' case had riveted national attention on the tragedy that befalls children and
families when adoptions go awry. The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws had been hard at work on the Uniform Adoption Act which
would be approved and recommended for enactment in all the states at its 1994
Annual Conference.5 2 West Virginia's adoption statute had not been amended in
any way for nearly a decade and there was a growing belief in the community of
adoption practitioners that reform needed to happen.
On April 29, 1994, the Institute voted to accept the Adoption Reform
Project. On June 13 and August 8, 1994, the reporter for the project- and West
Virginia College of Law Professor Carl Selinger, long-time Secretary of the
Institute, appeared before the West Virginia Legislature's Interim Joint
Subcommittee on Foster Care and Adoption. The Legislature provided the
requested support for the project and an Advisory Committee was formed to review
the existing statute, target problem areas, and draft amendments.
The membership of the Institute's Advisory Committee drew upon the
many disciplines and parties involved in the adoption process. Attorneys, judges,
legislative staff, the Department of Health and Human Resources, private adoption
agencies, counselors, adult adoptees, adoptive parents, members of the clergy,
and
6
College of Law professors active in the family law area were all represented.5
51

For an account of the travails of Baby Jessica, see Lucinda Franks, The War for Baby Clausen,

THE NEW YORKER MAG. 56 (March 22, 1993). For the opinion that adjudicated the merits of the case, see In
re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992).
52
For an excellent review of the process that resulted in the hotly debated Uniform Adoption Act,
see Joan Heifetz Hollinger, The Uniform Adoption Act: Reporter'sRuminations, 30 FAM. L.Q. 345 (Summer
1996). The convergence of cases like Baby Jessica's with the deliberations that would produce the Uniform
Adoption Act is discussed in Mark Hansen, Fearsof the Heart, 80 A.B.A. JOURNAL 58 (Nov. 1994).
53

Notes and Memoranda from WVLI Meeting, Charleston, W. Va. (April 29, 1994) (on file with

author.)
54
Attorney Heidi Kossuth was the first reporter for this project and facilitated all meetings of the
Advisory Committee and appeared before the Legislature to secure approval of the project. Professor Lisa

Kelly, this author, was the second reporter and, as such, drafted the Institute's proposed bill and presented it
to the Legislature.
Notes and Memoranda, W. Va. Legislature's Interim Joint Subcommittee on Foster Care and
Adoption (June 15 and Aug. 8 1994) (on file with author).
55

Members of the Advisory Committee were: David A. Barnette, adoption practitioner with the firm
of Jackson & Kelly; Barbara Baxter, then president of the West Virginia Bar and representative of birth
parents; Gwen Bridges of the Department of Health and Human Resources; Hon. W. Craig Broadwater, then
Circuit Judge of Ohio County; Maureen Conley, attorney for the Legal Aid Society and representative for
56
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The one perspective not directly represented in the process was that of the
birth parent. The search for birth parent spokespeople, within the state of West
Virginia, proved unsuccessful. One might speculate that this silence was due in part
to the fact that West Virginia still labored under the stigmatizing traditional
adoption system, in which birth parents were to disappear and never be heard from
again after having "given up" their biological children for adoption.57 In order to
ensure that this central, but silenced, voice in some way would be heard, attorneys
who had represented birth parents in actions challenging adoptions, joined the
committee.
The Advisory Committee met several times during the fall of 1994 and the
spring of 1995. The committee identified and studied several problem areas within
the current law, and finally, narrowed the list of issues to be considered. In
reviewing the current law, the Advisory Committee worked closely with the
Uniform Adoption Act to determine how much of the substance and procedure of
that Act would work well to address problems in West Virginia.58
The Institute spent the next year drafting and reworking a proposal to take
to the Legislature and, in the fall of 1996, the West Virginia Law Institute
presented its proposed amendments to Chapter 48, Article 4 of the West Virginia
Code during the interim session.

birth parents; Penelope Crandall, Administrative Director for Family Law Masters and adoptive parent; Robin
J. Davis, then family law practitioner; Cynthia Evans, attorney with Legislative Services; Professor Lisa
Kelly, adult adoptee, author of this article, final reporter for the project and current Family Law Professor at
West Virginia University College of Law; Heidi Kossuth, initial reporter for the project, adoption
practitioner, and adoptive parent; Professor Cynthia Mabry, then Family Law Professor at West Virginia
University College of Law; John L. McClaugherty, representative on the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and attorney with Jackson & Kelly; Donna McCune, adoption
counselor with Burlington United Methodist Child Placement Adoption Services; Bob Richardson, then
attorney with the West Virginia Legal Services Plan and prospective adoptive parent; Margaret Kaye Smith,
M.S., L.P.S.W., adoption counselor; Hon. O.C. Spaulding, Circuit Judge of Mason County; Homer A.
Speaker, adoption practitioner and adoptive parent; Marlena Villers, adoption counselor with the West
Virginia Adoption Exchange of the Childrengs Home Society of West Virginia and adult adoptee; Jennifer
Bailey Walker, legislative staff of the West Virginia Senate Judiciary Committee; and the Rev. Richard Zelik,
Roman Catholic priest and pastor of St. Anthony's Parish in Charleston, West Virginia. Notes, Formation of
WVLI Advisory Committee, Adoption Reform Project (1994) (on file with author).
57
For a discussion of the effects of the traditional closed adoption, and the movement toward a more
open system, in which communication between the birth and adoptive families is welcomed rather than
dreaded, see Appell, supranote 7 at 483.
The beginnings of the institutionalized form of closed adoption in this country were the result of
Victorian ideal of asexuality among girls and women. Consequently, unmarried women who became pregnant
were to flee shamefully into exile to the newly established homes for unwed mothers, where they would be
encouraged to place their children for adoption with more suitable families. From these roots grew a system
of closed adoption, in which both the birth mother and the adoptive parents suffered from a potential stigma if
word ever leaked either that the birth mother had had sex before marriage or that the adoptive mother was not
somehow able to produce a child within the context of marriage. See REGINA G. KUNZEL, FALLEN WOMEN,
PROBLEM GIRLS: UNMARRIED MOTHERS AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL WORK, 1890-1945

(1993). For a discussion of societal attitudes toward unwed birth mothers from colonial America through
today, see ANNE B. BRODZtNSKY, Surrenderingan Infant ForAdoption: The Birthmother Experience, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 296-300 (David M. Brodzinsky and Marshall D. Schechter, eds. 1990).
58
Notes and Memoranda, WVLI Advisory Committee meetings, Adoption Reform Project (19941995) (on file with author).
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The West Virginia Law Institute's Proposed Reforms

The central goals5 9 underlying the Institute's proposed legislation were: 1)
to secure the finality of adoptions through heightening the protection of birth
parents' rights on the front end of the process, while establishing a definite period
beyond which no adoption could be challenged; 2) to clearly define abandonment
so that children could move beyond the limbo caused by absent parents; 3) to
promote the use of the Voluntary Adoption Registry by making it a part of the
adoption process; and 4) to develop a procedure for court approval of expenses to
be paid to birth parents in order to safeguard against improper practices in the
private adoption context.60
Other issues had surfaced as important during discussions with the
Advisory Committee, but they did not find their way into the final product either
because of concerns over the state's limited resources or because it was felt that
excessive controversy might derail any reform at all. For instance, many on the
Advisory Committee felt that West Virginia's practice of requiring a home study
only after the child had been placed in the home was not in the best interest of the
child. In addition, some on the committee believed that only those with training to
perform adoption counseling should be appointed to perform those home studies.
However, the consensus ultimately was that, in many counties, access to
individuals with the requisite training is limited, that DHHR did not have adequate
staff to perform home studies in cases that did not involve child abuse or neglect,
and that such a requirement would ultimately raise the cost of adoption and deter
the placement of children in middle and lower income homes. 61 Therefore, because
of the state's limited human and financial resources, no changes were proposed to
the home study or placement provisions of the current Act. This decision was made
after considering
the lengthy treatment given child placement in the Uniform
62
Adoption Act.
59

In addition to the main points which are the focus of the article, the Institute proposed changes at
the micro level as well. Not all of the proposed amendments will be addressed in this article. However, the
Table in this article, Part II.A infra, mentions a few more of the details not covered in the main body of this
text.
60
A copy of the drafts of the bill proposed by the Institute are on file with the author.
61

Notes, WVLI Advisory Committee meetings, Adoption Reform Project (1994-1995) (on file with

author).
62

A total of nineteen sections of the Uniform Adoption Act are devoted to the placement of minors

for adoption. These provisions recognize that children are placed for adoption in a variety of ways: some
directly by their birth parents; others by agencies and departments; and still others are placed after being held
first in the hospital. The following is a Table of Contents of those sections setting forth the subjects covered:
PART 1. Placement of Minors for Adoption
2-101
2-102
2-103
2-104
2-105

Who May Place Minors for Adoption
Direct Placement for Adoption by Parent or Guardian
Placement for Adoption by Agency
Preferences for Placement When Agency Places Minor
Recruitment of Adoptive Parents by Agency
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Another example of an issue that the Advisory Committee shelved, despite
a belief in its importance involved the need to regulate new reproductive
technologies. Even though the Advisory Committee perceived a need to address
this new and growing frontier in adoption, it was believed that walking into this
controversial area could result in a protracted legislative debate that might stall or
kill the enactment of any reform.
These cautious instincts undoubtedly were well-founded. Adoption, often
portrayed as the happy portion of the family law caseload, stirs deep emotions
when it comes to defining the terms of its regulation. The National Conference of
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws unexpectedly discovered the highly charged
reality of this situation both during and after the deliberations that produced the
Uniform Adoption Act. No other subject that they had reviewed had stirred up
passions like this one.' No other issue hits our culture in all of its soft spots at
once. Class, race, gender, motherhood, fatherhood, the age old nature-nurture
question: It was quickly discovered that all of these buttons are pushed in any
discussion of adoption policy. First, the National Conference, then the West
Virginia Law Institute and, finally the West Virginia Legislature wrestled with the
strongly felt beliefs that surround this complicated area of the law.
a.

The West Virginia Law Institute's Notice and Consent
Procedure

Under the Institute's proposal, the level of protection afforded birth parents
at the beginning of the adoption process was increased. Nearly all members of the
2-106
2-107
2-108

Disclosure of Information on Background
Interstate Placement
Intercountry Placement

PART 2. Preplacement Evaluation
2-201
2-202
2-203
2-204
2-205
2-206

Preplacement Evaluation Required
Preplacement Evaluator
Timing and Content of Preplacement Evaluation
Determining Suitability to be Adoptive Parent
Filing and Copies of Preplacement Evaluation
Review of Evaluation

2-207

Action by Department

PART 3. Transfer of Physical Custody of Minor by Health-Care Facility for Purposes of Adoption
2-301

"Health-Care Facility" Defined

2-302
2-303
2-304

Authorization to Transfer Physical Custody
Reports to Department
Action by Department

UNiF. ADOPTION AcT, Table of Contents, 9 U.L.A. 4 (Supp. 1999).
The "bitter disagreements" and "divisive issues" that surfaced during the protracted debates

among the National Conference of Commissioners on State Laws are described in Joan Heifetz Hollinger,
The Uniform Adoption Act: Reporter'sRuminations,30 FAM. L.Q. 345,347-49 (Summer 1996).
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Advisory Committee shared a strong belief that by heightening the deference
accorded birth parents, three critical goals would be served. First, birth parents
would be respected and protected from exploitation. Second, adoptions ultimately
would be more secure against constitutional attack. Finally, the increased level of
protection would justify enacting a finite period beyond which an adoption could
not be challenged. To accomplish these goals of finality and protection, the
Institute first looked to the critical notice and consent provisions of the statute.
Under the Institute's proposal, consents and relinquishments were to be
obtained not only from birth mothers and legal or determined fathers, as required
under the then existing statute, but also from "outsider fathers" and "putative
fathers."' 6 By adding two new classes of fathers for consent purposes, the Institute
sought to protect the rights of virtually all birth parents and insulate the finalized
adoption from attack by those who might challenge its constitutionality.
"Outsider fathers" referred to a new category of fathers recognized by the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Roy Allen S. v. Stone.6 5 Under Stone,
the court held that a father who is not the legal father of a marital child may, in
certain circumstances, successfully bring a paternity action with regard to the
marital child. 66 This decision was based on the West Virginia Constitution;
therefore, the Advisory Committee thought it prudent to include this new class of
fathers among those from whom consent would be required.
"Putative fathers" were defined as those whom the birth mother named as
possible biological fathers, who are neither determined nor legal fathers.67 These
two new classes of fathers significantly broadened the pool of individuals from
whom consents would be required. However, it did not necessarily include all
biological fathers. For instance, it would still be possible for the actual biological
father to be excluded from these categories if the birth mother does not name him
as the child's father. Another example of a biological father left out of the consent
requirements would be the anonymous sperm donor.
Nevertheless, the Institute's approach did involve many more biological
fathers in the consent process than under the then-existing law. This cautious
approach recognized that the then-existing consent provisions could form the basis
of a constitutional attack by a putative father on a number of grounds. First, the
putative father could argue that his fundamental parental rights were violated by not
requiring his consent. Second, he could argue that by giving all biological mothers
the right to consent, while according only certain classes of biological fathers the
right to consent, the state violated his equal protection rights. Finally, the putative
father could make an argument that he was deprived of his interest in parental

64

See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CHAPTER 48, ARTICLE 4 OF THE WEST VIRGINIA
CODE

[hereinafter WVLI PROPOSAL] § 48-4-3(a)(3), (6) (West Virginia Law Institute, Prof Lisa Kelly, Reporter,
1996) (on file with author).
65

474 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1996).

6

Id.
WVLI PROPOSAL, supra note 65, § 48-4-1(c).

67
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rights without due process.6
In addition to including more fathers in the consent process, the Institute
also proposed that the procedure for executing consents be subject to increased
regulation. Petitioners in fraud or duress cases often alleged facts concerning the
suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the consent document. In
one case, it was alleged that the consent had been executed in the mother's hospital
room.69 In another, the consent had been signed in the office of the lawyer who
represented the adoptive parents. 70 Often, the underlying storyline of these
narratives involved poor, illiterate, and young birth mothers being pushed into
signing an indecipherable document by people far more sophisticated than she.
Even though the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals refused to find
fraud or duress under these facts,71 the Advisory Committee felt that justice
required that potentially exploitive situations be avoided. Both the integrity of birth
parent decisions and the security of the adoptions that flowed from them demanded
it.
The Institute debated many possible resolutions to this problem, from
requiring the appointment of counsel for all birth parents, to in camera hearings on
all consents.72 Ultimately, the Advisory Committee rejected most of these solutions
as either too expensive or too patronizing to the birth parent who was already sure
of her placement decision. In the end, the Institute proposal sought to have the
execution of consents removed from the offices of the agencies and lawyers who
would be involved in the adoption. A laundry list of possible persons before whom
a consent could be taken was proposed,73 and other provisions were designed to
insure that every birth parent understood the available services, including the
68

These arguments will be examined flurther in the author's forthcoming article in the West Virginia
Law Review Spring Symposium issue, Family Law in the Year 2000. See 102 W. VA. L. REv. (forthcoming
Spring 2000).
69
See Baby Boy K. v. Velas, 386 S.E.2d 839, 840 (W. Va. 1989).
70

See Wooten v. Wallace, 351 S.E.2d 72, 73 (W. Va. 1987).

71

See Velas, 386 S.E.2d at 843; Wallace, 351 S.E.2d at 75.

72

Notes, WVLI Advisory Committee meetings, Adoption Reform Project (1994-1995) (on file with

author).
73

The Institute Proposal provided that one of the following individuals would be present during the

signing of the consent

1) ajudge ofa court of record;
2) an individual whom ajudge of a court of record designates to take consents or relinquishments;
3) an employee whom an agency designates to take consents or relinquishments, but not an
employee of the agency to which the minor is relinquished;

4) a lawyer other than a lawyer who is representing an adoptive parent or the agency to which the
minor is relinquished;
5) a commissioned officer on active duty in the military service of the United States, if the
individual executing the consent or relinquishment is in military service; or
6) an officer of the foreign service or a consular officer of the United States in another country, if
the individual executing the consent or relinquishment is in that country.
WVLI PROPOSAL, supra note 65, § 48-4-3a(b).
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Voluntary Adoption Registry. Other requirements were proposed to verify that the
birth parent understood the meaning and consequences of the consent or
relinquishment being signed. The individual before whom the consent was signed
was to certify that s/he had orally explained the contents and consequences of the
consent to the birth parent and that the birth parent was provided a copy of the
consent at the time of the signing.7 4
In one of the most hotly debated proposals drafted by the Institute, the
consent provision was changed to allow the birth parent 192 hours from the time of
the execution of the consent to revoke that consent.75 Within the Advisory
Committee, members disagreed over whether this was too short or too long a
period. Some wanted to maintain the irrevocability of the consent as it was in the
existing statute. Some felt that the time ought to be different in the case of infant
adoption as compared to the adoption of a toddler or youngster. Concerns were
raised, under the existing statute, about postpartum depression and the competency
of mothers only three days away from delivery to make such permanent decisions.
Those who favored a longer period argued that, if most physicians will not release
postpartum women to return to work until six weeks after delivery, birth mothers
should have at least that amount of time to revoke a consent to adopt the child from
whose birth they were recovering. Others argued that the nine months of pregnancy
was enough time to decide. Some counselors hypothesized that lengthening the
period would only prolong the birth mother's inevitable grieving period.76
Ultimately, the Institute decided upon the 192-hour period as a compromise.77 In
78
doing so, the Institute patterned its proposal after the Uniform Adoption Act.
The Advisory Committee also recognized that some birth parents
anguished over the effect of their consent or relinquishment should the other birth
parent refuse to give his or hers. Would giving a consent ultimately disqualify the
birth parent from being the custodial parent should the adoption fall through?
Would the consent result in the other birth parent automatically receiving custody
of the child? For some birth parents, the prospect of the other birth parent having
custody of the child was a real problem. Placing a child for adoption can be the
loving act of a birth parent who realizes that s/he cannot raise the child and that the
other birth parent will be abusive toward the child or otherwise unable to care for
the child. It seemed that these parents deserved some way out of the Catch-22 in
which they found themselves.
Hence, the Institute proposed that consents and relinquishments could be
negotiated with conditions that would allow for revocation if the conditions were

74

See id. § 48-4-3a(c), (d).

75

See id. § 48-4-5(a)(1).

76

For a discussion of the psychological effects of adoption on the birth mother, see BRODZINSKY,

supra note 58 at 295-315.
77

Notes, WVLI Advisory Committee meetings, Adoption Reform Project (1994-1995) (on file with

author).
78
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not satisfied. If a condition, for example, obtaining the consent or relinquishment of
the other birth parent, was not met, then the consent or relinquishment could be
revoked. 79 This measure seemed even more appropriate given the fact that, under
the Institute's proposal, the classes of birth fathers from whom consent would be
required was being expanded with unknown fathers receiving greater attention.8°
The Institute also realized that one of the reasons that the public was
exposed to the heart-rending scenes of Baby-Turned-Toddler Jessica being torn
from her adoptive home was the delay caused by the judicial system. The challenge
to Jessica's adoption was actually brought within weeks of her placement.8 The
Institute felt that it was important that custody of the child be adjudicated pending
any disputes concerning the adoption. Consequently, the Institute proposed that a
series of irrebuttable or rebuttable presumptions apply, depending upon the grounds
given for the revocation of the consent. These presumptions changed with the
burden of proof required in each type of revocation. For instance, in the case of a
revocation within the 192-hour period, the child was to be returned immediately to
the birth parent with custody prior to the execution of the consent. However, in the
case of a revocation charging fraud or duress, which required clear and convincing
evidence to prevail, the adoptive parents could rebut the presumption in favor of
the birth parents by showing that return of the child would result in irreparable
harm.8 2 By including these provisions, the Institute hoped to soften the blow for the
child who is the subject of a disrupted or dissolved adoption."
The Institute also proposed changes to the content of the consent itself.
The consent or relinquishment would have to be in plain language, rather than
legalese, and in the language of the signatory if that person's first language was not
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See WVLI PROPOSAL, supranote 65, § 48-4-5(a)(4).
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See discussion infra.
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See Lucinda Franks, The Warfor Baby Clausen, THENEW YORKER MAG. 56 (March 22, 1993).
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See WVLI PROPOSAL, supra note 65, § 48-4-5(c), (f).
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The rate of disruption and dissolution in adoptions is relatively low. Disruption refers to an
adoption which does not continue prior to its legalization. Dissolution, on the other hand, is used to describe
an adoption that fails after finalization. See Trudy Festinger, Adoption Disruption:Rates and Correlates,in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 201 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schecter eds. 1990).
If an adoption is to fail, it is more likely to do so before finalization. Disruption rates are estimated
at 20%. After legalization, however, the dissolution rate drops to 2%. The rate of disruption increases with the
age of the child placed. For example, only 1%of infant adoptions disrupt, despite the fact that these receive
most of the press attention. For children ages twelve to eighteen, the rate of disruption is 13.5%, and for
special needs children, 14.3%. Rates of disruption are also higher for children with longer stays in foster care.
National
Adoption
Information
Clearinghouse,
Disruption
and
Dissolution,

http://www.calib.com/nalcladtsear/ adoption/research/stats/disruption.htm, site visited on June 6, 1999. Other
correlates for higher rates of disruption include whether the adoptee had siblings or whether she or he had
experienced prior placements. One study also found that older male children with siblings and multiple
placements were more likely to disrupt than similarly situated girls. FESTINGER, supra at 209.
Also worth noting is that disruption or dissolution results primarily from the adoptive parents'
decision that the placement is not working. Less than .1% of all adoptions are contested annually. NAIC,
DisruptionandDissolution,supra.
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English.84 Information about how and where to revoke consent or relinquishment
within the 192-hour period would need to be included within the document itself.a5
The Institute adopted the language provided by the Uniform Adoption Act in the
6
section governing the content of the consent or relinquishment.

84

See WVLI PROPOSAL, supra note 65, § 48-4-3b(a).

85

See id. § 48-4-3b(a)(6).
The Uniform Adoption Act, section 2-406 on the Content of Consent or Relinquishment
provides,

in part:
(d) A consent or relinquishment must state:
(1) An understanding that after the consent or relinquishment is signed or confirmed in
substantial compliance with section 2-405, it is final and, except under a circumstance
stated in section 2-408 or 2-409, may not be revoked or set aside for any reason,
including the failure of an adoptive parent to permit the individual executing the consent
or relinquishment to visit or communicate with the minor adoptee;
(2) an understanding that the adoption will extinguish all parental rights and obligations
the individual executing the consent or relinquishment has with respect to the minor
adoptee, except for arrearages of child support, and will remain valid whether or not any
agreement for visitation or communication with the minor adoptee is later performed;
(3) that the individual executing the consent or relinquishment has:
(i) received a copy of the consent or relinquishment;
(ii) received or been offered counseling services and information about adoption which
explains the meaning and consequences of an adoption;
(iii) been advised, if a parent who is a minor, by a lawyer who is not representing an
adoptive parent or the agency to which the minor adoptee is being relinquished, or, if an
adult, has been informed of the right to have a lawyer who is not representing an
adoptive parent or the agency;
(iv) been provided the information and afforded an opportunity to sign the document
described in section 2-404(e) [document pertains to the future release of identifying
information; this language was substituted with the Voluntary Adoption Registry
language]; and
(v) been advised of the obligation to provide the information required under section 2106 [information on the medical and social background of the child];
(4) that the individual executing the consent or relinquishment has not received or been
promised any money or anything of value for the consent or relinquishment, except for
payments authorized by [Article] 7;
(5) that the minor is not an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25
U.S.C. sections 1901 et seq..;
(6) that the individual believes that the adoption of the minor is in the minor's best
interest; and
(7) if a consent, that the individual who is consenting waives further notice, unless the
adoption is contested, appealed or denied.
(e) A relinquishment may provide that the individual who is relinquishing waives notice
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Resolution of the issues surrounding consent or relinquishment did not end
the matter of procedural due process'in adoption cases. Determining to whom,
when, and how notice of the proceedings is to be given remained. As noted above,
under the former West Virginia adoption statute, notice of the adoption proceedings
was to be given to "any known person entitled to parental rights" in the child. 87 If
any of these individuals had signed a consent or relinquishment waiving their right
to notice or if their rights otherwise had been terminated, then no notice needed to
be given to them.8
In the original notice provision presented to the West Virginia Legislature,
the Institute altered the notice statute in very minor ways. 9 It added requirements
that the notice be in plain language and more explicit with regard to the
consequences of failing to reply in a timely manner.90 It also set forth provisions
dealing with when and how notice to the unknown father would be required.91
This first draft was inadequate because of the persistence of the lack of
clarity as to who fell into the category of those "entitled to parental rights."
Therefore, after one appearance before the Legislature to hear its concerns and
further considerations, the Institute resubmitted altered drafts on the notice
provisions.
The second draft explicitly listed those individuals entitled to notice,
unless those individuals had waived their right to notice or otherwise had their
rights terminated. Those entitled to notice were: 1) individuals from whom consent
was required; 2) an individual whom the petitioner knew was claiming to be the
father of the adoptee and whose paternity had not been established; 3) any person
with rights to custody or visitation of the child by court order in effect at the time of
the adoption; 4) the spouse of the petitioner if that spouse had not joined in the
petition; and 5) a grandparent of a minor adoptee if the grandparent's child is a
deceased parent of the child and, before death, the deceased parent's parental
relationship to the minor child had not been terminated. 2 In addition, the court, at
any time during the proceedings, could order that notice be provided to a person
who had revoked consent or "a person who, on the basis of a previous relationship
with the minor adoptee, a parent, an alleged parent, or the petitioner, can provide
information that is relevant to the proposed adoption and that the court in its

of any proceeding for adoption, or waives notices unless the adoption is contested,
appealed or denied.
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-406,9 U.L.A. 54 (1999) (bracketed language added).
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W. Va. Code § 48-4-8 (1996) (amended 1997).
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See id.
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See WVLI PROPOSAL, supra note 65, § 48-4-8.
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See id. § 48-4-8(c).
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See id § 48-4-8(e).
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See WVLI PROPOSAL, supra note 65, § 48-4-8(a) (Alternative Draft Nov. 18, 1996) (on file with

author).
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93
discretion wants to hear.,
To the extent that the notice provisions reached beyond even those
arguably entitled to parental rights, the new notice provisions reflected the concerns
voiced by members of the Interim Joint Committee on the Judiciary, before whom
the author appeared. Several members of the committee voiced strong concerns that
biological grandparents be included in the adoption process. Some even inquired as
to why grandparents should not be required to consent before an adoption could
proceed. The drafted language including certain grandparents and others with
visitation or custody rights was offered by way of compromise to those who felt
that a biological grandparent's wishes should be taken into account.94
Objections were heard within the Advisory Committee that these changes
to the notice and consent procedures would lengthen the paperwork and overburden
the process. However, in the end, the Institute believed that the increased burden
would be offset by the benefit of insuring that all birth parents fully understand the
ramifications of their decisions, and that no person with a legal claim to the child
was excluded. In addition, it was believed that these increased efforts to protect all
birth parents justified providing a closed-ended period beyond which individuals
could not challenge an adoption decree.

b.

The West Virginia Law Institute Addresses the Problem
of the "Unknown Father"

One of the most difficult problems in adoption is the existence of the socalled "unknown father." Certainly, there are occasions where the actual identity of
the father is completely unknown, as would be the case for a woman who
conceived a child with a person she did not know, was the victim of a stranger rape,
or for a child who is the product of an anonymous sperm donor. In other
circumstances, it may be that the mother is uncertain of the identity of the father
because of multiple partners. In still other cases, it might be that the identity of the
father is known, but his location is not. Finally, it may be that the birth mother
knows who and where the father is, but for her own reasons, she chooses not to
disclose this information.
The reasons a woman would chose not to disclose the father undoubtedly
are as numerous as the women who find themselves in this difficult position.
Members of the Advisory Committee involved in adoption counseling offered
several reasons why a birth mother might choose not to reveal the identity of a
father. Some of these reasons may be abuse, incest, fear of embarrassment to the
birth father, fear of being pressured to keep a child she feels unable to raise or to
93
94

See id. § 48-4-8(b).

For articles detailing and analyzing the ebb and flow of the grandparentls rights movement, see
Kathleen S. Bean, Grandparent Visitation: Can the Parent Refuse?, 24 J. FAM. L. 393 (1985); Karen
Czapanskiy, Grandparents,Parents,and Grandchildren:Actualizing Interdependency in Law, 26 CoNN. L.
REV. 1315 (1994). For articles in search of the proper role of grandparents in adoption proceedings, see
Kristen Jones Indermark, Note, Permissive Intervention: Grandparents' Key to Entering Adoption
Proceedings, 26 GA. L. REV. 787 (1992); Judy E. Nathan, Note, Visitation After Adoption: In the Best
Interests of the Child, 59 N.Y.U. L. RIv. 633 (1984).
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with the father, or, finally, simple anger directed toward the
remain in a 9relationship
5
birth father.
The issue of how far to push the mother to disclose the identity of an
unknown father cuts to the core of society's beliefs about the relative power and
responsibility of women versus men when it comes to decisions involving the
future of newborn children. Do, or should, women have a superior right to decide
what will happen with the child they alone carry in their bodies for nine months?
Does mother know best? Or do birth fathers, by virtue of the donation of their
genetic material and the fact that the law would hold them accountable for child
support, have equal rights to determine their offsprings' futures?'
In the end, the Institute's proposal was patterned after the Uniform
Adoption Act. section 3-404 of the Uniform Adoption Act requires an investigation
by the court into the identity of the unknown father. The model Act does not
provide for how this "inquiry of appropriate persons" is to be conducted or how the
required information is to be provided to the court.97 However, it does list the
information, at a minimum, that the court should have at its disposal after the
inquiry is complete. 98
Notes, WVLI Advisory Committee meetings, Adoption Reform Project (1994-1995) (on file with

95

author).
9
The case ofKessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1998) recently addressed this question in an
opinion which recognized the torts of fraudulent concealment of information and interference with parental
rights. The impact of this case will be more thoroughly examined in this author's article forthcoming in the
West VirginiaLaw Review's Spring Symposium Issue, FamilyLaw in the Year 2000. See 102 W. VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming Spring 2000).
97

The Uniform Adoption Act simply requires:
If, at any time in a proceeding for adoption or for termination of a relationship of parent
and child under [Part] 5, the court finds that an unknown father of a minor adoptee may
not have received notice, the court shall determine whether he can be identified. The
determination must be based on evidence that includes inquiry of appropriate persons in
an effort to identify an unknown father for purpose of providing notice.

UNiF. ADOPTION Acr § 3.404(a), 9 U.L.A. 79 (1999).
98
Subsection 3-404 (b)details the information that must be gathered:
(b) The inquiry required by subsection (a) must include whether:
(1) the woman who gave birth to the minor adoptee was married at the probable time of
conception of the minor, or at a later time;
(2) the woman was cohabiting with a man at the probable time of conception of the minor;
(3) the woman has received payments or promises of support, other than from a
governmental agency, with respect to the minor or because of her pregnancy;
(4) the woman has named any individual as the father on the birth certificate of the minor or
in connection with applying for or receiving public assistance; and
(5) any individual has formally or informally acknowledged or claimed paternity of the
minor in a jurisdiction in which the woman resided during or since her pregnancy, or in
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The Institute proposal adopted the basic format of the Uniform Adoption
Act, but required that the information be provided via an affidavit signed by the
birth mother. This affidavit would be attached to the adoption petition. 99 The
Institute proposal lifted all of the areas of inquiry required by the model Act and
added a few more of its own, including whether the birth mother had identified any
man as the father to any hospital personnel and whether she had told any man that
he is the father of the adoptee."
Under the Institute's draft, the birth mother's affidavit would also include
provisions designed to inform her of the consequences of failing to identify or
misidentifying the biological father or to otherwise address some of the concerns
that might underlie a birth mother's desire not to name the birth father. For
example, the proposed affidavit was to state that the birth mother had been
informed: 1) that her failure to provide accurate information could result in delays
or disruptions in the adoption; 2) that the provision of the information will be used
only for adoption purposes; 3) that the affidavit will be sealed once the adoption is
complete; and 4) that she has been informed of the availability of protection against
domestic violence. 101
By taking these steps, together with allowing conditional revocations of
consents, the Institute hoped to encourage birth mothers to identify fathers without
the lurking fear that, by doing so, they will expose themselves, the birth fathers or
their children, to abuse or ridicule. The concern was voiced within the committee
that the coercive nature of the affidavit would result in fewer women placing their
children for adoption if it meant disclosing the father. For some within the
committee, those who viewed adoption as presenting loss to the birth parent and/or
child, this result was a perfectly acceptable one. For others, it was
seen as a threat
10 2
to the availability of children who should be placed for adoption.
Finally, the Institute proposed that, after the court's review of the
information provided by the affidavit, the court should determine whether the
taking of any additional evidence is necessary. If the court felt the need for
additional evidence, it must order its production for the court's review at least sixty
days prior to the final hearing. 0 3 If the father is identified, he should be provided
notice. 1°4 If the father is unable to be identified, then the court should determine
whether notice by publication is likely to lead to receipt of notice by the father. If
which the minor has resided or resides, at the time of the inquiry.
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-404(b), 9 U.L.A. 80 (1999).
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See WVLI PROPOSAL, supra note 65, § 48-4-7(b).
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See id. § 48-4-7(b)(5)-(6).
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See id. § 48-4-7(b)(8)-(10).
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Notes, WVLI Advisory Committee meetings, Adoption Reform Project (1994-1995) (on file with

author).
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See WVLI PROPOSAL, supra note 65, § 484-8b(a) (Alternative Draft Nov. 18, 1996) (on file with

author).
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See id. § 48-4-8b(b).
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so, then publication is to be ordered. If the father is unable to be identified, and the
court believes that publication would not be likely to lead to receipt of notice by the
father, then the court may dispense with publication. l 05
C.

The West Virginia Law Institute Defines Presumptive
Abandonment

If a birth parent who is required to provide consent does not do so, then
that person's parental rights must be terminated if the adoption is to proceed.
Abandonment is the most frequent ground relied upon in terminating parental rights
under the general adoption statute. 0 8
As noted in Part L.A above,107 West Virginia's common law definition of
abandonment required that the petitioner prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the parent whose rights were sought to be terminated had evinced a clear and
settled purpose to forego all duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.108
It was also clear from the case law that a failure to financially support the child
alone was insufficient to prove abandonment.' 9 The non-custodial parent could
also find refuge in the defense that his attempts to contact his child had been
thwarted by the custodial parent.' 10 The abandonment standard set a high bar for
the petitioner.
The Advisory Committee believed that the common law parameters were
adequate to define abandonment generally, but that a definition of conduct
presumptively constituting abandonment would enhance predictability of decisions.
The committee also believed that it was critical to provide the courts with guidance
as to how far back in time they were to look in deciding whether a parent had
abandoned his or her child.
The Advisory Committee looked to other state statutes, such as those of
105

See id § 48-4-8b(c).

106

In West Virginia, parental rights may also be terminated in the context of child abuse and neglect
proceedings. In that case, the proceedings are typically initiated by the state and are governed by Chapter 49,
Article 6 of the West Virginia Code. An adoption may follow as part of the permanency planning for the
child.

Generally, the Uniform Adoption Act provides that parental rights may be terminated for failure to
support/communicate with the child (i.e., abandonment), for conviction of a crime ofviolence indicating that
the respondent is unfit, because the respondent is neither the marital nor genetic father of the child, or for any
reason provided under the state's statute for involuntary termination of parental rights. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT
§ 3-504(c), 9 U.L.A. 86 (1999).
See supra Part I.A.
107

See In re Adoption of Mullins, 421 S.E.2d 680 (W. Va. 1992) (non-marital father found not to
have abandoned his daughter, even though he had neither visited nor supported his child for four years prior
to the maternal grandparents' filing petition for adoption); In re Adoption of Schofstall, 368 S.E.2d 720 (W.
Va. 1988) (marital father found not to have abandoned son where mother and step-father thwarted visits even
though no child support was paid for three years prior to the petition for adoption); Change of Name of
Harris, 236 S.E.2d 426 (W. Va. 1977) (abandonment defined in the context of a name change petition).
108
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See Mullins, 421 S.E.2d at 682 (W. Va. 1992) (quoting Schofstall, 368 S.E.2d at 722).
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See Mullins, 421 S.E.2d at 682; Schofstall, 368 S.E.2d at 722-23.
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New York111 and Illinois,1 12 as well as the Uniform Adoption Act, to formulate its
section on conduct presumptively constituting abandonment. Both New York's
statute and the Uniform Adoption Act treated parents of children younger than six
months differently from parents of children older than six months. Both allowed for
abandonment of newborns to be found under similar circumstances.
For children six months of age or older, the Uniform Adoption Act and
New York's adoption statutes had similar, but not identical, provisions. The
Uniform Adoption Act terminated the parental relationship if, for a period of six
months prior to the filing of the adoption petition, the parent had: 1) failed to
financially support the child within his or her means; 2) failed to visit or
communicate regularly with the child; and 3) demonstrated that, at the time of the
termination, he or she is able and willing to assume legal and physical custody of
the minor.113 New York maintained a similar financial support requirement, but
more specifically required monthly visits or contact with the child during the sixmonth period. New York was also more explicit 14about the fact that the
abandonment provisions applied to non-marital fathers.
The Advisory Committee struggled with whether the six month temporal
scope that seemed to be the norm was appropriate. From an adult's point of view,
six months seemed a short time indeed. However, from a child's point of view, six
months without any attention from a parent, may well seem like an eternity."5
Ultimately, the Advisory Committee settled on the six month period believing that
a biological parent should not be allowed to ignore the existence and needs of a
child for over six months and then rest upon his or her fundamental rights to
undermine an adoption by a 16prospective parent who stands ready to meet that
child's needs on a daily basis.'
The next question was whether the committee should recommend that
abandonment ever be found when the child involved was younger than six months
old. Although the Uniform Adoption Act did not use the term "abandonment," it
ill

See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1999).
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See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/8 (West 1999).

113
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See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-504(c)(2), 9 U.L.A. 86 (1999).
See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11 l(1)(d) (McKinney 1999).
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The ground-breaking work that first focused attention upon utilizing a child's concepts of time in

custody decisions, JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF

THE CHILD (1973), would argue that little weight should be given to the fact of biological parenthood if no
attachment was formed between that biological parent and his or her child. Attachment is formed by fulfilling
the immediate emotional and physical needs of the child. This child-centered philosophy has been further
developed in recent legal scholarship. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatchingthe Egg: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1752 (1993) (finding in the wonderful Dr. Seuss
fable "Horton Hears a Who" a theory for "making the authority of parenthood contingent on service to
children"); Karen Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 957
(1999) (arguing that custody determinations ought to recognize and reward those who have been the child's
caregiver as well as those who have supported the caregiver).
116
Notes, WVLI Advisory Committee meetings, Adoption Reform Project (1994-1995) (on file with

author).
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did hold that the parental rights of a child less than six months old could be
terminated if the parent had failed, without compelling reason: 1) to pay, within
his' 17 means, reasonable medical expenses associated with pregnancy and birth of
the child; 2) to financially support the child within his means; 3) to visit the child
regularly; and 4) to show a willingness to be the custodial parent if the child was
not in the other parent's custody. 18 New York had similar financial and medical
support provisions119 and added the requirement that, in order to be entitled to
withhold consent, the out-of-wedlock father must have lived with the child's
mother for six months prior to the adoptive placement, while holding the child out
as his own. 120 Further, if the putative father had signed a notarized instrument after
the child's conception, in which he denounced paternity of the child, his consent
need not be sought in order for the adoption to proceed.121
The Institute blended provisions from the New York statute, the Uniform
Adoption Act, and West Virginia's own case law, to craft its definition of
presumptive abandonment. For children six months or older, the court was to look
at whether, during the last six months preceding the filing of the adoption petition,
the parent continuously had: 1) failed to financially support the child within his or
her means; and 2) had failed to visit the child when physically and financially able
to do so and was not prevented from doing so by the child's custodian. 122
For children younger than six months, the Institute proposed that
abandonment could be presumed when the birth father: 1) denounces the child's
paternity after conception; 2) fails to provide medical support for the pregnancy and
birth of the child commensurate with his means; 3) fails to financially support the
infant within his means; and 4) fails to visit the child.1l 3
The Institute's draft was careful to make clear that the conduct described
was presumptive only and that it could be rebutted by a showing that the noncustodial parent's attempts to visit or communicate were thwarted by the custodial
117
I use the pronoun "his" here even though the Model Act's language refers to the gender-neutral
term "respondent" I do so because it is plain, not only from the substance of the suggested statutory
language, but also from the comment section that this section is directed to fathers:
Under subsection (c)(1) [the section governing termination of parental rights for a child
less than six months old], a respondentfather'srights may be terminated on the basis of
his behavior prior to the minor adoptee's birth, including a failure to manifest an ability
or willingness to assume parental duties, unless he can prove a "compelling reason" for
his failure.

UNIF. ADOPTION AcT § 3-504 (comment), 9 U.L.A. 87 (1999) (emphasis added and explanation provided in
brackets).
See UNIF. ADOPTION AT § 3-504(c)(1), 9 U.L.A. 86 (1999).
118
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See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § IIl(1)(e)(iii) (McKinney 1999).
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See id § I1l(1)(e)(i)-(ii).
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See id. § 111(2)(e).
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See WVLI PROPOSAL, supra note 65, § 48-4-3c(a).
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See id. § 48-4-3c(b).
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parent. 124 Furthermore, the respondent was always permitted the opportunity to
"demonstrate to the court compelling circumstances preventing such parent from
supporting or visiting the child. 125
The Advisory Committee was aware that, in other states with similar
standards, "compelling circumstances" became the subject of intense litigation,
particularly when the birth parent was incarcerated. 126 While the committee was
comfortable with vesting the courts with the discretion to construe the meaning of
"compelling circumstances" on a case-by-case basis, there was one circumstance
that all members of the Advisory Committee believed should not ever be construed
as compelling. The Advisory Committee added a proviso directing "that in no event
shall incarceration provide such a compelling circumstance if the crime resulting2 in
such incarceration was one involving a rape in which the child was conceived.' 1
Finally, by retaining the common law abandonment definition in the
"Definitions" section,128 the Institute also sought to drive home the point that the
conduct listed in its "Presumptive Abandonment" provisions did not provide the
exclusive avenue to a finding of abandonment; rather, it was intended as a
description only of one set of conduct that should always be considered
abandonment, unless properly defended against. The possibility remained for other
theories of abandonment to be considered by the court, without the benefit of the
presumption.
d.

WVLI Opens the Door Adoption

Just a Crack -

to Open

Controversy ignites when the issue of open adoption is placed on the table
around which any diverse group of adoption practitioners and participants sits. It is
first important to take a deep breath, figure out what we mean by "open adoption,"
and parse out the sub-issues that flow from this topic.
Although open adoption may generate any number of questions to be
addressed by the law, the central concept of open adoption is the rejection of the
typical adoption paradigm, upon which most statutes are based; a paradigm
grounded in "exclusivity, secrecy, and transposition, through which the adoptee...
is taken from one family and given to another, with all vestiges of the first family
removed. 129
Open adoptions may take any number of forms, but typically, they involve
124

See id. § 48-4-3c.

125

See id. § 48-4-3c(c).

126

Notes, WVLI Advisory Committee meetings, Adoption Reform Project (1994-1995) (on file with

author).
127

WVLI PROPOSAL supra note 65, § 48-4-3c(c).

128

See id. § 48-4-1(o).

129

Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for Collaborative

Adoption Law andPractice, 75 B.U. L. REv. 997, 997 (1995).
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the birth parent(s)' participation in the child's placement, an ongoing relationship at
some level between the adoptive and birth parents, which may exist both before
and after the adoption, and some agreed upon level of interaction between the birth
parent(s) and child."lz The amount of contact between the parties to the adoption
may be minimal or substantial; it may be in person or in writing; it may merely
involve providing the birth parents with photographs and updates on the child's life
or it may involve regular visitation."'
Adoption theorists refer to three different types or degrees of open
adoption: 1) confidential, in which minimal information is shared indirectly
between adoptive and birth family members before the adoptive placement; 2)
mediated, in which non-identifying information is shared between the parties
through an adoption agency that serves as a go-between; or 3) fully disclosed
adoptions, in which identifying information is shared directly between the adoptive
and birth families."
The controversy surrounding open adoption arises from the collision of the
beliefs underlying the exclusive model and the open adoption model. Parties from
both camps argue that their model of adoption is in the best interests of adopted
children. Those opposing open adoption argue that the exclusivity of the adoptive
parent-child relationship is critical to avoid confusion and conflicting loyalties for
the child. Opponents are also concerned about disruption in the bonding process
that might occur.133 Finally, some opponents also question the wisdom of giving so
much power to birth parents. These opponents fear both the birth parents' lack of
to pick their children's parents, as well as their interference as the child
judgment
l3 4
grows.

Proponents counter that open adoption frees all parties from the
stigmatizing effects of adoption; that, in particular, it frees the child from
fantasizing, for good or ill, about her or his birth parents and allows the child the
best access to information about his or her biological heritage. Having answers to
questions can also prove helpful to adoptive parents as they go about the business
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For an explanation of the typical steps in an open adoption, see RAPPAPORT, supra note 7, at 9-12.
For a good documentary account portraying open adoptions as they played out in the lives of actual adoptive
families, see 48 Hours: FamilySecret (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 15, 1992).
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For the varying degrees of openness possible in open adoptions, see

RAPPAPORT,

supra note 7, at

3, 173-76.

See National Adoption Information Clearinghouse
132
www.calib.com/nalctadptsear/adoption/research/statsopen.htm>.

(visited Jun.

17,

1999) <http'J/

133

For a discussion of the arguments behind the positions of open adoption opponents, see Appell,
supranote 7 at 490.
See RAPPAPORT, supra note 7, at 74-75 (discussing the frequently asked question, "But can they
134
choose the right people to be the parents of their child?"). The research also suggests that, despite the

frequently expressed concern that birth parents might interfere or harass adoptive parents, a significant
majority of adoptive parents (72%) were very satisfied with the contact they were having with the birth

mothers. See National Adoption Information Clearinghouse
<http'//www.calib.com/naicladptsear/adoption/researcb/ stats/open.htm>.

(visited

Jun.

17,
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of dealing with a child's daily health and emotional problems. 3 5 Finally, for birth
parents, open adoption not only gives them greater control over the selection of
their child's adoptive family, it also provides them with peace of mind as to the
child's safety and ongoing development.13
The law of supply and demand has also impacted the growth of open
adoptions. While the number of individuals seeking to adopt has remained
relatively steady over the years, the number of healthy infants has dropped137 due to
the availability of abortion'3 8 and the growing social acceptability of single
parenthood.13 9 In addition, while the availability of healthy infants available for
adoption has decreased, the number of children awaiting adoption out of foster care
has risen. These children are usually older and already know their biological
parents.1 40 Open adoption serves the needs of both situations.
For those seeking to adopt healthy infants, open adoption shortens the wait
from several years to less than one. 41 The reason for this decrease in waiting time
135

See Berry, supranote 7 at 131.

136

However, research does show that having a fully disclosed adoption is no guarantee that the birth

parent will be able to successfully resolve her grief over the placement of her child. Birth mothers seem to
suffer a grieving process no matter which form of adoption is used. See H.D. GROTEVANT & R.G. MCRoY,
OPENNESS IN ADOPTION: EXPLORING FAMILY CONNECTIONS (1998). In fact, one study showed that birth
mothers in open adoptions were significantly more troubled than those in closed adoptions in the areas of
social isolation, sleep complaints, physical symptoms, despair and dependency. See Berry, supra note 7, at
131.
137
Statistics show the following decline in adoption placements for pre-marital births:
From 1952-1972, 8.7% of all premarital births were placed for adoption.
From 1973-1981, this percentage fell to 4.1%.
From 1982-1988, it dropped even further to 2%.
See National Adoption Information Clearinghouse, Placing Childrenfor Adoption (visited Jun. 17, 1999)
<http:lwww.calib.comlnaicladptsear/adoptionlresearchlstatslplacing.htm> (data based upon Kathy S.Stolley,
Statistics on Adoption in the United States, 3 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 26-42 (1993)).
138
The initial drop in adoption placement rates for white women correlated with the increase in
abortion rates after the legalization of abortion in 1973. See National Adoption Information Clearinghouse,
Placing Children for Adoption <http://www.calib.comlnaicladptsear/adoptionlresearchlstatsplacing.htm>
(data based upon C.A. Bachrach, K.S. Stolley & K.A. London, Relinquishment of Premarital Births:
Evidencefrom the NationalSurvey Data,24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 27-32,48 (1992)).
However, there has been no research showing that the continuing decline in adoption placements
is due to a currently rising abortion rate. In fact, abortion rates have continued to decline since 1990. See
National Adoption Information Clearinghouse, Placing Children for Adoption (visited Jun. 17, 1999)
<http://www.calib.com/naictadptsear/adoption/researchlstats/ placing.htm> (data based upon M. Freundlich,
Supply and Demand: The ForcesShaping the Future of Infant Adoption, 2 ADOPTION Q. 13-42 (1998)).
139
The continuing decline of infant adoption placements in the 1980s through today is likely the
result of greater social acceptability of unwed pregnancies. See National Adoption Information
Clearinghouse,
Placing
Children
for
Adoption
(visited
Jun.
17,
1999)
<http://www.calib.com/naic/adptsear/adoption/research/statsplacing.htm> (data based upon C.A. Bachrach,
K.S. Stolley & K.A. London, Relinquishment of PremaritalBirths: Evidence from the National Survey Data,
24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 27-32,48 (1992)).
140
See Appell, supra note 130 at 1008-1013.
141

See RAPPAPORT, supranote 7, at 3-4.
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is that many birth parents are willing to consider allowing their children to be
adopted only if they can participate in the placement of the child and perhaps have
contact after adoption.'42
For those children in need of permanent homes out of foster care, open
adoption may make sense as well. First, these children likely already know their
birth parents and may wish to continue having contact with them. Further, birth
parents with children in foster care are more likely to voluntarily terminate their
rights to their children so that they may be adopted if the parents know that they
will continue to be able to have some contact with them. In some cases, children
remain in foster care longer than they should, thereby reducing their chances for a
permanent home, because their birth parents are unable to care for them and yet
unwilling to let go.1 3 The legal process to terminate parental rights involuntarily
also takes time. Time is the enemy of the foster child in search of an adoptive
home.1" Open adoption can speed up those cases in which the termination of
parental rights is underway and where some ongoing contact between the child and
birth parent is in the child's interest. 4
Unless the law explicitly prohibits open adoption agreements, parties to an
adoption are, of course, free to make agreements to continue contact after the
child's adoption is finalized. However, when the terms of these agreements are
brought before the court for enforcement, if the statute is silent, courts must decide
whether they are enforceable. Prior to the 1997 revisions, West Virginia's adoption
142

One study found that four times as many women facing a crisis pregnancy would be willing to

consider adoption if an open adoption program were available to them, as opposed to only traditional
adoption alternatives. See RAPPAPORT, supranote 7, at 39-40.
143
See generally Appell, supra, note 130.
144

With the exception of the youngest infants, adoption rates decline as the age of children in foster

care rises:

44% of those children adopted out of foster care were between 1-5 years old.
37% were 6-10 years old.
15% were 11-15 years old.
2% were 16-18 years old.
2% were less than one year old.
The fact that the adoption rate is so low for the youngest infants likely reflects the slowness of the child abuse
and neglect system, rather than the fact that these children are not adoptable. After parental rights are
terminated, most children who are eventually adopted out of foster care waited 6-I1 months for adoption. See
National Adoption Information Clearinghouse, Adoption from Foster Care (visited Jun. 17, 1999)
<http.//www.calib.comlnaicladptsear/adoption/research/ stats/foster1999.htm>.
145

Contrary to popular belief, not all parents who become embroiled in the child abuse and neglect

system are cruel child abusers. The largest percentage of children involved in the system are there because of
neglect rather than abuse. See Diana J. English, The Extent and Consequences of Child Maltreatment, 8 THE

FuTuRE OF CHMLDREN 39, 44-45 (1998). This neglect may arise from any number of factors, some within and
others beyond the control of the parent. For example, some children suffer neglect due to their parentlis
retardation or other disability. These parents and children often demonstrate deep affection for one another,
even if the parent is unable to provide the care that the child needs. For a discussion ofthe parental rights of
mentally retarded individuals, see Chris Watkins, Beyond Status: The Americans with Disabilities.Actand the
ParentalRights of People Labeled Developmentally Disabled or Mentally Retarded, 83 CAL: L. REv. 1415

(1995).
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statute did not address this question. However, arguments against their enforcement
certainly could be found in the provisions addressing the effect of adoption" 6 and
the invalidity of contracts that violated the statutes' provisions.147
Other issues raised by the open adoption paradigm involve the treatment of
adoption proceedings and records. The same policies which support an open
adoption proceeding would argue against sealing adoption records and
proceedings." A second and more charged question is whether adoption records
generated under a previously sealed system should be opened.' 49
Finally, open adoption may change the way the law views some of the
ancillary consequences of adoption. Some of these issues involve how intestate
succession is impacted by adoption and whether visitation rights should be
extended to other members of the child's extended biological family, such as
grandparents or siblings.' 50
146

W. VA. CODE § 48-4-11 (a) (1996) (amended 1997) provides:
Upon the entry of such order of adoption, any person previously entitled to parental
rights, any parent or parents by any previous legal adoption, and the lineal or collateral
kindred of any such person, parent or parents, except any such person or parent who is
the husband or wife of the petitioner for adoption, shall be divested of all legal rights,
including the right of inheritance from or through the adopted child . . . and shall be
divested of all obligations in respect to the said adopted child.

This provision remained unchanged after the 1997 legislative session.
147

W. VA. CODE § 48-4-15 (1996) (amended 1997) provides:
Any contract, agreement or stipulation which ... endeavors to alter the time or manner
of adoption as provided in this article, is contrary to the public policy of the State and
such portion of any contract, agreement or stipulation is null and void and of no effect.

This section of the statute was not changed during the 1997 legislative session.
148
For a sociological analysis of the open versus sealed records debate, see KATARINA

WEGAIt,

ADOPTION, IDENTITY AND KINSHIP: THE DEBATE OVER SEALED BIRTH REcORDS (1997).
149
Often the question of whether to open sealed adoption records is brought forward by adoptees
who are searching for information about their birth parents or the circumstances of their adoption. A 1980s
survey projected that 500,000 adult adoptees were seeking or had found their birth parents. An even more
recent study of adopted adolescents found that 72% wanted to know why they were adopted, 65% wanted to
meet their birth parents, and 94% wanted to know which birth parent they looked like. The percentage of all
adoptees wanting to obtain identifying information regarding their biological parents varies according to the
studies performed - between 60% and 90% - but is by all counts high. See National Adoption Information
Clearinghouse, Searching for Birth Relatives (visited Jun. 17, 1999) <http://www.calib.comnaic/
adptsear/adoption/research/stats/search.htm>.
Books chronicling the importance of this search include BETTY JEAN LIFTON, JOURNEY OF THE
ADOPTED SELF: A QUEST FOR WHOLENESS (1994); NANCY NEWTON VERRiER, THE PRIMAL WOUND:
UNDERSTANDING THE ADOPTED CHILD

(1993).

Occasionally, searches are also initiated by birth parents. See In re Adoption of Baby S., 705 A.2d
822 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997).
Typically, these search cases pit the values of confidentiality and privacy of the birth parents
against those of the adoptee's personal identity or health. A recent case also considered the privacy interests
of the adoption agency involved versus the adoptee's right to know about the circumstances surrounding the
taking of her birth parents' relinquishments. See In re Margaret Susan P., 733 A.2d 38 (Vt. 1999).
150
For discussion of the value of sibling andfor grandparent visitation in the adoption context, see
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Within the Advisory Committee, a diversity of opinion existed as to which
adoption model best suited the competing interests and needs of the parties. Adult
adoptees felt strongly that the closed model arguably served everyone's needs and
protected everybody's rights, except those of the adopted child who, was treated
more like a piece of property to be transferred than a human being with a right to
know the most basic facts about who she or he is. Others on the committee felt that
open adoption should be an option, but not the only method by which adoptions
should take place. Still others felt that by allowing even voluntary open adoptions,
we would begin the slippery slide that would end in the opening of previously
sealed records, an end which would result in breaking serious promises made to
birth and adoptive parents who relied upon those covenants. 15'
It was clear that this Advisory Committee was not in a position to
recommend a complete shift from the traditional adoption model that had
predominated the West Virginia statute for years. However, ultimately the reporter
took a position of compromise that opened the door, just a crack, to the open
adoption model. In recognition of the growing popularity of open adoptions, the
expectations of the parties who enter into them, and the needs of adopted children,
one provision was inserted into the Institute's proposal, which allowed for the
enforcement of post-adoption visitation agreements, if the court finds those
agreements to be in the best interest of the child.15 2
Given the location and the context of this provision, it could hardly be read
as the strongest endorsement of open adoption. The provision was drafted into the
section dealing with the finality of the adoption decree. The subsection began with
the pronouncement that no adoption decree could "be challenged for failure to
Laurie A. Ames, Open Adoptions: Truth and Consequences, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 137 (1992); Christine
D. Markel, A Questfor Sibling Visitation: Daniel Weber's Story, 18 WHITMIER L. REv. 863 (1997); William
Wesley Patton & Dr. Sara Latz, Severing Hansel From Gretel: An Analysis of Siblings' Association Rights,
48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 745 (1994); Tammy M. Somogye, Opening Minds to Open Adoption, 45 U. KAN.L.

REV. 619 (1997).
Either by case law or statute, some states recognize sibling and grandparent rights to visitation
post-adoption decree. See, e.g., People ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard, 429 N.E.2d 1049 (N.Y. 1981); In re
Adoption of Anthony, 448 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Fain. Ct. 1982); Thril v. Baldwin, 473 S.E.2d 715 (Va. CL App.

1996); FLA. STAT. ch. 39A69 (5) (1998).
For articles concerning the impact of adoption generally on inheritance, see Jan Ellen Rein,
Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REv. 711

(1984); The Adopted Child'sInheritancefrom IntestateNaturalParents,55 IOWA L. REv. 739 (1970).
151

See Notes, WVLI Advisory Committee meetings, Adoption Reform Project (1994-1995) (on file

with author).
152
The Institute's proposal provided:
(d) The validity of a decree of adoption issued under this chapter may not be challenged
for failure to comply with an agreement for visitation or communication with an
adoptee, but the court may hear a petition for said agreement. When considering such
petitions to enforce, the court shall determine whether the enforcement of such
agreement would serve the best interests of the child, and may, where the court feels it
appropriate, consider the wishes of a child of the age and.maturity to express those
wishes to the court.
WVLI PROPOSAL, supranote 65 § 48-4-12(d).
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15
comply with an agreement for visitation or communication with an adoptee." '
However, the language which followed set up the right to appear before the court
for enforcement. In addition to using the "best interests" standard to resolve these
controversies, the Institute's proposal also allowed for the court to "consider
1 the
wishes of a child of the age and maturity to express those wishes to the court. 0
By taking this moderate approach, the Institute sought to balance the
expectations of the parties against the interests of the adopted child. Even though a
birth parent could argue that the adoption would not have existed but for her or his
reliance upon a promise of visitation or communication, invalidating a finalized
adoption because of a failure to honor that promise would place the promise above
the child's need for family continuity. Also, to strictly enforce a visitation or
communication promise, without consideration of the child's interests or desires
would be to elevate contract principles over traditional family law principles, which
hold that visitation should be determined or modified based upon the child's best
interests. Such an approach would again treat the child as a commodity in the
adoption "transaction," rather than an individual with needs to be met.
In addition to allowing for the enforcement of visitation or communication
agreements if found to be in the child's best interests, the Advisory Committee also
thought that it was important to promote the existence of the Voluntary Adoption
Registry throughout the adoption statute.'5 The Institute's proposal was peppered
with references to the availability of this service. By informing parties to an
adoption of the existence of this service, the Advisory Committee hoped to assist
those individuals, in a limited way, in their search efforts should they choose to
learn more about each other when the adoptee reached adulthood.
Even if a consensus could have been reached to shift West Virginia's
adoption statute toward a system of open adoptions with open records, concerns
about the controversy generated by such a drastic shift in policy likely would have
led the Institute to reject a complete overhaul in the direction of open adoptions.
Throughout the Institute discussions, a high value was placed upon accomplishing
necessary improvements, without stalling any reform in a hailstorm of controversy.
Hence, allowing the enforcement of visitation or communication agreements under
circumstances that met the child's best interest seemed an appropriate compromise
that signaled the need to recognize the growing prominence of open adoptions,
while still allowing for closed adoptions to continue.

e.

The Institute's Attempt to Bring Clarity to Proper
Adoption Expenses

Adoption practitioners struggled to find the proper balance between
providing for pregnant birth mothers, while steering clear of the criminal
153

Id.

154

Id.

155

The article governing the existence and operation of the Voluntary Adoption Registry can be

found at W. VA. CODE § 48-4A-1 to -8 (1999).
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prohibition against offering or giving them something of value in consideration for
consenting to the child's adoption by another. Although providing for pregnant
birth mothers in need could be considered an allowable expense incurred in
connection with legal adoption proceedings, it could also be construed as felonious
baby buying. Such ambiguities also put birth mothers in danger of being charged
with baby selling, an identically punishable felony.'5 6 Finally, the lack of an
accounting requirement under the statute allowed for improper amounts of cash or
goods to change hands under the arguable guise of properly incurred adoption
expenses. Expenditures by unscrupulous adoption practitioners allowed a climate
of adoption placements in which the baby went to the couple or individual willing
to be the most generous to the birth parents.
As a side note, no study or research was performed to determine the true
extent of this problem. Rather, the need to address this problem seemed to come
from a general feeling of concern by some adoption lawyers that they not
unwittingly open themselves up to criminal liability. Whether and how often birth
parents actually engage in or encourage this imagined bidding process for their
offspring is a matter of considerable dispute. Many would argue that this issue is
largely the figment of the negative stereotypes society carries around in its
imagination about birth parents. l 7
Nevertheless, in dealing with this issue, the Advisory Committee
considered listing, with more specificity, the types of expenses that should or
should not be allowed in adoption placements and proceedings. However, the
committee quickly concluded that there could be no one exhaustive list of proper
expenses because every potential birth parent had his or her own unique set of
circumstances and needs. Consequently, the Institute's proposal took two steps
toward providing some measure of clarity, while at the same time preserving
judicial discretion.
First, the Institute's proposal required that an affidavit of fees or expenses,
paid or promised by the adoptive parents, should be submitted to the court at the
final hearing. 5 8 By simply requiring an accounting, the Institute hoped to inject
156

See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-16 (1996) (amended 1997).

157

For a discussion of the negative stereotypes that society uses to characterize birth parents, see

RAPPAPORT, supra note 7, at 66-67, 71-72.

What is the real demographic associated with birth parents who place their children for adoption?
Different studies portray different results. A California study found that birth mothers who independently
placed their children were between the ages of seventeen and thirty and had no more than a high school
education. A broader-based study, however, found that women who place their children for adoption often
come from intact families in which their mothers had at least one year or more of college. These women have
greater educational and vocational goals for themselves than those who keep their children when faced with
an unplanned pregnancy. See National Adoption Information Clearinghouse, Placing Childrenfor Adoption
(visited Jun. 17, 1999) <http'/www.calib.com/nac/adptsear/adoption/research/stats/placing.htl>.
It is possible that the ideas that West Virginia practitioners have about birth parents as being poor
and with few options are an accurate depiction of the West Virginia birth parent population, given the high
rates of poverty in West Virginia generally. For instance, 33% of children in West Virginia are poor. West
Virginia ranks 48"' in the nation for child poverty levels. See Children's Defense Fund, 1998 West Virginia
Profile (visited Dec. 13, 1999) <http:/ www.childrensdefense.org/states/data-wv.htm>.
158
See WVLI PROPOSAL, supra note 65 § 484-16.
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some recognition among those engaged in adoption placements that they needed to
consider the propriety of all expenses because the court would consider the
propriety of each expense.
Second, the Institute proposed that payments of all pregnancy and living
expenses of a birth mother should be itemized and pre-approved by the court prior
to their being spent.1 59 This provision admittedly was more problematic than the
accounting provision. On the one hand, it tied the hands of those who justifiably
needed to make an emergency expenditure to the birth mother, such as to pay for
emergency medical treatment to preserve the pregnancy. On the other, the fact that
it directed this intense scrutiny only to expenses paid to birth mothers seemed to
overlook the possibility that birth fathers, particularly those from whom consent
was required, could just as easily use their power to extort funds improperly from
adoptive parents.
However, the Institute felt that some check needed to be placed upon
improper spending and that some security needed to be provided to those parties
who acted innocently to assist birth parents through the pregnancy and birth of their
children. These small changes sought to bring a greater degree of integrity and
certainty to the adoption and placement processes.
C.

The West Virginia Law Institute Presents its Proposed Statute to the
Legislature

On September 28, 1996, the full Council of the West Virginia Law
Institute voted to propose the adoption reform legislation generated by the meetings
of the Advisory Committee. 60 On October 14, 1996, 1 traveled with Professor Carl
Selinger, then West Virginia Law Institute secretary, to present
the proposed
161
legislation to the Joint Interim Subcommittee on the Judiciary.
I knew from previous correspondence with legislative staff members that
the Institute was likely to be questioned about the proposed eight-day revocation
period. 62 This reform reflected a big change in the way practice of adoption law,
and, from the point of view of those who
represented adoptive parents, the change
163
was seen as ill-advised or threatening.
159

See id.

See Memorandum from Professor Carl Selinger, Secretary to Members of the West Virginia Law
Institutels Adoption Law Reform Project (Sept. 17, 1996) (on file with the author).
161
See Lisa Kelly's Itemized Statement of Time Spent as Reporter on the West Virginia Law
Institute's Adoption Reform Project (Oct. 17, 1996) (on file with the author). For press accounts of this
appearance, see Birth Parents Would Have Six Months to Challenge Adoptions Under Law, THE DOMINION
POST, Oct. 15, 1996, at 8B; Panel Looks at Adoption Law, CHARLESTON GAzErE, Oct. 15, 1996, at 8D.
162
See Letter from M.E. "Mike" Mowery, General Counsel to the House of Delegates, to Heidi
Kossuth, then Reporter for the WVLI Adoption Law Reform Project (Aug. 4, 1995) (on file with the author).
163
See Letter from David Allen Barnette, adoption lawyer, to Lisa Kelly (Sept. 23, 1996) (on file
with author) (arguing against the revocation period "as a time period which increases cost, delays bonding,
puts adoptive parents at risk and will trouble birth mothers who do not like their children to end up in foster
care.").
160
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Indeed, I was asked about the source and underlying rationale behind the
recommendation that all those signing consents should have eight days to change
their minds. Some individuals on the committee thought the change unnecessary.
Others wondered if the eight day period was too short and inquired whether the
proper amount of time ought to be at least fourteen days. I was also asked to bring
back to the Legislature information on what other states allow. The subcommittee
struggled, as did the Institute's Advisory Committee, with this issue and sought to
resolve its disagreement by finding a benchmark in the practices of other states.
In response to this request for more information, I later wrote a letter that
164
summarized how revocation periods were handled by other states. In this letter, I
pointed out that only nine other states treated properly executed consents as
irrevocable." The remaining states allowed for some revocation period, some as
long as ninety days or even twelve months.16 6
During this initial presentation to the Legislature, the rationale was
explained repeatedly that, by affording birth parents additional protections on the
front end of the process, two critical goals would be accomplishedO 1) birth
parents would receive the protection that both the West Virginia and federal
constitutions afford them; and 2) the absolute finality of adoptions would be
justified and secured. While it did appear that there was interest in achieving the
latter goal of finality, particularly in light of the complete lack of it in the then
existing statute, the first goal of protecting birth parents' interests sparked less
enthusiasm among many members of the subcommittee.
While the question of birth parent protection did not seem to preoccupy
some of the more vocal members of the subcommittee, what was of interest was
bringing birth grandparents into the notice, or even consent, provisions of the
statute. One or two members felt very strongly that West Virginia is a state with a
long tradition of recognizing the value of an extended family and that, in honoring
those values, birth grandparents ought to be able to veto an adoption or at least be
notified about it and allowed to intervene.
Quite frankly, birth grandparents' rights was an issue that caught this
reporter somewhat flat-footed. After attempting to explain that birth parents had
fundamental constitutional rights with regard to their children,167 rights which had
not yet been extended to grandparents," I promised to ponder further the question
See Letter from Lisa Kelly to Delegate Barbara Fleischauer and Senator Edwin Bowman, CoChairs of the Joint Interim Subcommittee on the Judiciary (Dec. 5, 1996) (on file with the author).
See id
165
164
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See id.
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See Rozas v. Rozas, 342 S.E.2d 201 (W. Va. 1986) (recognizing the constitutionally protected

interests one has in his or her "natural children").
The West Virginia Supreme Court had recognized the right of visitation for a grandparent whose
168
grandchild is the child of the grandparent's deceased child, even in the case of a step-parent adoption. See In

Re Petition of Nearhoof, 359 S.E.2d 587 (W.Va. 1987). A statutory scheme giving grandparents who did not
have access to their grandchildren through their children the right to petition for visitation was later enacted.
See W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-1 to -12 (1999). This scheme recently has been broadened to allow any
grandparent to petition for visitation of his or her grandchild, although the burden upon the petitioner
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of what role, if any, birth grandparents should have in the adoption process.
At the Institute's second appearance before the interim subcommittee on
November 18, 1996,169 a redraft of the notice provisions was offered to the
Legislature. This notice provision did allow for grandparents to be notified under
limited circumstances. Birth grandparents would be entitled to notice if they were
related to the grandchild through a deceased child of their own who had not
executed a consent to the adoption or otherwise had his rights terminated prior to
his or her death. In addition, the grandparent who had an established custody or
visitation order would also be entitled to notice, as would any other individual with
adjudicated custody or visitation interests. 170 This alternative language satisfied the
commitee's desire to honor the important role of grandparents, while not allowing
them the power to trump the biological parent's constitutionally protected right to
make decisions affecting their children. The subcommittee seemed content with
this compromise.
During these two appearances, the rationale behind all of the proposed
changes was presented. The presentation was not as detailed as that offered in this
article, but the written proposal was accompanied by a comment section that sought
to summarize the rationale for the proposed reforms. In terms of legislative interest,
the most dialogue was generated by the issues of the revocation period, the
treatment of grandparents, and the agreed upon need for finality in adoptions.
Members of the sub-committee were also interested in keeping the cost of adoption
as low as possible and inquired as to the expense of a typical adoption.
In my second appearance before the Legislature, I informed the subcommittee that the cost of adoption varied, depending upon whether the adoption
was a private agency adoption, a public agency adoption (i.e. one sponsored by the
Department of the Health and Human Services), or an independent adoption.' 7'
Step-parent or other inter-familial adoptions would also not be as expensive
as
172
other types of adoptions, in which home studies were most often required.
It was difficult to discover how much individuals charged for independent
becomes heavier when the grandparentls own child has access to the grandchild at issue. See id.
169
For press accounts of this second appearance, as well as other legislative business conducted that
day, see Advisory Panel. State Inevitably Responsiblefor Cable Negotiations, THE DOMINION POST, Nov. 19,
1996, at 8A.
170
See WVLI PROPOSAL, supra note 65 § 48-4-8. For a more detailed discussion of this provision,
see supraPart I.B.2.a.
171
Average national price ranges for the various types of adoptions are as follows:

Domestic public agency adoptions: Zero to $2,500.00
Domestic private agency adoptions: $4,000.00 to $30,000.00 +
Domestic independent adoptions: $8,000.00 to $30,000.00 +
Intercountry private agency or independent adoptions: $7,000.00 to $25,000.00
National Adoption Information Clearinghouse, Adoption Research and Statistics: Cost of Adopting (visited
June 17, 1999) <http:ll www.calib.conlnaic/adptsear/adoption/ research/stats/cost.htm>.
172
Nationally, home studies run anywhere from $700.00 to $2,500.00. National Adoption
Information Clearinghouse, Adoption Research and Statistics: Cost of Adopting (visited June 17, 1999)
<http:// www.calib.com/naic/adptsear/adoption/ research/stats/cost.htm>.
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adoptions in West Virginia. However, private agency fees were ascertainable. My
contact with the various agencies operating in the state revealed that one agency
charged a fee of $9,675.00, excluding medical and legal fees; another reported a
cost of $20,500.00 per adoption; and still another used a sliding fee scale in which
fees for the adoption of healthy white infants were based upon 15% of the family's
total income, while the fees for the adoption of a "special needs' 173 child was 5% of
the family's total income. 7 4
One offshoot of this inquiry and concern for the cost of adoption was the
introduction of a proposal to allow a $2,000.00 tax credit for the adoption of a child
not related to the taxpayer. 75 This proposal was introduced
by a member of the
7
Legislature on his own initiative and finally passed. 1
At the close of the interims, no specific action had been taken on the
legislation. But on December 13, 1996, the Institute forwarded its amended
proposal to the Speaker of the House, Robert S. Kiss, and the President of the West
Virginia Senate, Earl Ray Tomblin." The bill was reintroduced into both houses
during the 1997 regular session. The grandparents' rights issue again surfaced and
became the focus of the debate. 78 The bill was voted out of the senate Judiciary
Committee in mid-March, but disagreements continued between the two houses.
The bill was sent to a conference committee of both houses.
Finally, on April 11, 1997, the conference committee, spearheaded by
Delegate Larry Rowe, resolved the differences between the senate and the house
versions and recommended a compromise bill to both houses. 79 The bill
recommended by the conference committee's report passed and was enacted on the
last day of the regular legislative session."c

One of the facts that startled me about adoption practice, generally, is that biracial children and
other children of color are characterized as "special needs," together with children who have handicapping
173

conditions or who have been part of the foster care system. The implications of this categorization are
provocative.

174
See Statement of Lisa Kelly before the West Virginia Legislature (Nov. 18, 1996) (on file with
the author).
175
For press accounts of this aspect of the adoption legislation, see Phil Kabler, MeasureAuthorizes
Fundsto Support Legislative Conference, CHARLESTON GAZETE, Mar. 12, 1997, at 6A.
176
See W. VA. CODE § 11-21-10a (1999).

177
See Letter from Carl Selinger, Secretary of the West Virginia Law Institute, to Bob Kiss, Speaker
of the House, and Earl Ray Tomblin, President of the Senate (Dec. 13, 1996) (on file with the author).
178
For press reports of the ongoing debate on grandparents rights in the adoption context, see Phil
Kabler, Measure Authorizes Funds to Support Legislative Conference, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, March 12,
1997, at 6A.
179
See SB No. 61, CC #1 4/9, filed in the Clerk's Office ofthe House of Delegates on April 11, 1997
(on file with the author).
180
See Winners andLosers, THE DOMINION POST, April 14, 1997, at SB; Ought There Be a Law?...,
CHARLESTON GAzETrE, April 28, 1997, at IC. For a more thorough discussion of the effect of the Act in the
press, see Jennifer Bundy, State HopingNew Adoption Laws Speed Up FinalProcess, PARKERSBURG NEWS,
Aug. 31, 1997, at IA.
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III. THE 1997 ADOPTION STATUTE

Most of the changes made to West Virginia's adoption statute during the
1997 amendment had their genesis in the West Virginia Law Institute's proposal.
However, not all of the Institute's proposed changes were adopted. As a general
matter, the Legislature acted consistently with the tenor of the interim
subcommittee hearings in that: 1) adoption finality was achieved; 2) grandparents
became involved in the adoption process under certain circumstances; 3) the
Institutes's expanded revocation period was rejected, as were some of the other
provisions which would have broadened the protection of birth parents; and 4) care
was taken to guard against increasing the expenses of the adoption.
A.

Section-by-Section Analysis Comparing the Pre-existingStatute with the
WVLI Proposaland the 1997 Enactment

The following table compares the pre-existing law, the Institute proposal
and the law as finally enacted in 1997:
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COMPARISON OF
PRE-1997 ADOPTION STATUTE, WVLI PROPOSAL
AND 1997 ENACTMENT
Section

Pre-1997 Statute

WVLI Proposal

1997 Enactment

48-4-1 Definitions.

Defines legal father,
determined father,
unknown father, birth
mother, birth father,
and adoptive parents.

Adds definitions of
putative father,
outsider father, birth
parents, marital child,
non-marital child, stepparent adoption,
relinquishment,
consent, abandonment,
and agency. Amends
definition of unknown
father. Elaborates on
different classes of
determined fathers.

Adopts the WVLI
changes

48-4-2 Who may
adopt.

Allows adoption by
married individuals
with spouse's joinder
or consent; or by

Not changed

Not changed

Adds the requirement
that consent be
received from outsider
fathers and putative
fathers; specifically
addresses that consent
not necessary if rights
are terminated;
requires joint petition
in step-parent

Adds all categories of
individuals proposed
by the WVLI except
putative fathers; adopts
all other WVLI
language.

unmarried individuals.

48-4-3 Persons whose
consent or
relinquishment is
required; exceptions,

Requires consent of the
mother and legal or
determined father, and
of the child if over
twelve years old;
specifies how to handle
consent if both parents
are deceased or if a
parent is under a
disability,

I adoptions.
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48-4-3a Timing and
execution of consent
or relinquishment.

No section 3a under
old statute; however,
the provision stating
that no consent shall be
taken except after the
expiration of seventytwo hours from the
birth of a child was
included in 48-4-5.

Retains seventy-two
hour provision.
Adds requirement: that
consents be taken
before described
judicial officers or
neutral lawyers or
agencies not involved
in the adoption;
Requires those
individuals to certify
that the affiant's
understanding of the
consent; that birth
parents be told of
available services,
including the
Voluntary Adoption
Registry.

Adopts the WVLI
proposal in part.
Requires consents be
taken before judges
and quasi-judicial
officers listed in WVLI
proposal.
Rejects language that
would have allowed
neutral lawyers or
agencies to take the
consents.
Rejects certification by
those officers
regarding parent's
understanding.
Rejects requirement
that birth parents be
advised of services.

48-4-3b Content of
consent or
relinquishment.

No section 3b under
old statute but 48-4-5
did require that the
consent include a
statement that the
affiant believes the
adoption to be in the
child's best interest
and that s/he
relinquishes all rights
and claims to the child;
that s/he is aware of the
consent's
irrevocability; that s/he
is acting voluntarily;
and that s/he waives
notice of further
proceedings.

Adds plain language
requirement.
Requires the listing,
inter alia, of: the date
of birth of the adoptee;
contact information for
the agency or attorney
for the adoptive parent;
specific instructions on
how to revoke; a
statement as to the
finality of the consent
unless properly
revoked; the effect of
the adoption; that the
affiant has received a
copy of the consent,
information about the
Voluntary Adoption
Registry, the duty to
provide information
required for filing of
the petition; waiver of
notice unless the
adoption is contested
appealed or denied.
Allows conditional
revocation of consent.

Adopts the WVLI
proposal, and adds a
subsection requiring
that the consent
contain language
authorizing the
adoptive parent(s) or
agency to consent to
medical treatment for
the child while the
adoption proceeding is
pending.
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48-4-3c Conduct
presumptively
constituting
abandonment

Did not exist

Establishes six-month
temporal scope prior to
filing of petition to be
examined for
unthwarted failure to
visit and support; for
infants less than six
months, looks to prebirth conduct;
establishes affirmative
defense of compelling
circumstances.

Adopts WVLI
language;
Adds provision
presuming unknown
father abandons his
child when he fails to
make reasonable
efforts to discover that
a pregnancy and birth
have occurred as a
result ofhis sexual
intercourse with the
birth mother

48-4-4 Consent or
relinquishment by
infants,

Requires that when
birth parent is under
eighteen, consent shall
be reviewed by the
court and a guardian ad
litem (g.a.l.) may be
appointed to conduct a
discreet inquiry from a
list ofindividuals to
determine whether
fraud or duress found,
but failing to appoint a
g.a.l. is not grounds for
setting aside a decree

No real change other
than to replace the
laundry list of
individuals from whom
the g.a.l. may inquire
with the language "any
person having
knowledge."

WVLI change adopted

48-4-S Revocation of
consent or
relinquishment for
adoption,

Allowed revocation at
any time for fraud or
duress; Allowed
revocation within ten
days if consent was
executed prior to the
seventy-two hour
period; Allowed
revocation within
twenty days for
conditions stated in the
consent.

Allowed for
revocation:
Automatically within
192 hours of
execution;
Upon agreement of the
parties;
For fraud fraud or
duress if proven by
clear and convincing
evidence;
if condition allowed
for in consent is proven
by a preponderance of
the evidence; or if the
consent does not
conform to
requirements. Provides
for method of custody
adjudication while
revocation is pending.
Establishes a thirty day

Rejects 192 hour
automatic revocation
period.
Raises burden ofproof
to clear and convincing
for allegations that the
consent did not comply
with the requirements
of the statute.
Rejects presumptions
in resolving custody
pending dispute and
instead requires the
court to set a hearing
within thirty days to
award temporary
custody based upon
child's best interests.

appeal deadline.
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48-4-6 Delivery of
child for adoption;
filing of petition.

Requires that adoptive
parents be provided
with information
concerning the child at
the time the child is
delivered to them;
allows petition to be
filed any time after the
child is placed, with or
without all required
consent; requires final
hearing after the child
has been with the
adoptive family for six
months.

Adds that among the
information to be
provided the adoptive
parents is the affidavit
of the birth mother in
the event of an
unknown father; adds
that petition may be
filed any time after all
possible consents have
been obtained and
hearing may be had
any time after the 6
months has expired
and proper notice has
been given and the
receipt of all consents
or all rights terminated.

Accepts all WVLI
proposals and adds a
forty-five day waiting
period after notice
before final hearing
can be had.

48-4-7 Petition and
appendix.

Requires that the
petition contain
information about the
child's parentage,
property, medical and
social information; sets
forth special
considerations for
when the petitioner is
less than fifteen years
older than the child;
requires sealing file.

Adds the requirement
that the birth mother
complete a specific
affidavit in the case of
an unknown father;
Requires that grounds
for termination of
rights be included in
petition; exempts stepparent adoptions from
the fifteen-year rule

Accepts WVLI
language.
Adds that the unknown
father affidavit is to be
executed before the
same person as the
consent and that it will
be sealed once the
adoption is complete.

48-4-8 Who shall
receive notice.

Requires notice to any
known person entitled
to parental rights who
has not signed a
consent or had his/her
rights terminated;
Provides for method of
service of notice; gives
twenty days to respond
to those who are
personally served and
thirty days to those
served by publication
or upon their personal
representative in the
case of an incompetent

Requires notice on:
those who must
consent; those whom
the petitioner knows
have claimed paternity,
even if no paternity
action, unless
abandonment is found;
individuals with legal
or physical custody or
the court-ordered right
to visitation; the
grandparent of an
adoptee if the
grandparent's child is
deceased and s/e had
not signed a consent
before death; court
may add parties to
receive notice as the
case evolves.

Accepts WVLI
language except men
whom the petitioner
knows have claimed
paternity need not
receive notice unless
paternity has been
established legally.
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48-4-a How notice is
to be served.

Sets up a hierarchy of
preferences with regard
to notice and states that
the notice shall inform
the person that his or
her parental rights may
be terminated; gives a
twenty day response
time.

Adds reference to
WVRCP; requires
plain language; adds
that birth mother's
name not to be
publicized unless
ordered by the court.

Adopts WVLI
language.

48-4-b Notice to an
unknown father,

Not dealt with in
previous statute,

Requires the court to:
inspect the affidavit
required by 48-4-7;
consider any additional
evidence and
determine whether its
possible to serve the
unknown father with
notice.
If father not identified,
court decides whether
publication would be
beneficial.

Adopts WVLI
language.

48-4-9 Proceedings.

Requires final hearing
to.be held no sooner
than six months after
child has resided with
the adoptive family,
Sets forth required
findings for final
hearing,
Creates "discreet
inquiry" requirement,
unless waived.
Allows the
appointment of a g.a.l.
for the child.
Establishes the best
interest standard for
adoption;
Requires the adoption
order to sever
relationship with birth
family and create
relationship with
adoptive family.
Prohibits disclosure of
birth parent names in
adoption order.

No changes proposed

Added that "discreet
inquiry" report may
include "other
information deemed
necessary by the court,
which may include a
criminal background
investigation."
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484-10 Recordation
of order; fees;
disposition of
records; names of
adopting parents and
persons previously
entitled to parental
rights not to be
disclosed; disclosure
of identifying and
non-identifying
information;
certificate for state
registrar of vital
statistics; birth
certificate.

Prohibits the disclosure
of the names of the
parties to the adoption,
except through the
Voluntary Adoption
Registry, or unless an
order for good cause is
obtained.

No change

No change

484-11 Effect of
order as to relations
of parents and child
and as to rights of
inheritance; intestacy
of adopted child.

See title

No change

No change

I
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48-4-12 Finality of
order; challenges to
order of adoption.

Allows for vacation of
the adoption by any
person not served with
notice as provided in
said provisions at any
time within one year
after that person learns
of or had reasonable
opportunity to learn of
the adoption.
Allows adult adoptee
to vacate adoption.

Provided that the
validity of a decree
may not be challenged
for any reason if more
than six months has
passed from the date of
the decree;
During the six months,
challenger alleging
failure to receive notice
bears clear and
convincing burden of
proof and the best
interest standard
applies.
Prohibits challenges
based upon the failure
to comply with a
visitation agreement
but allowed the
agreement to be the
subject of an
enforcement action
governed by the best
interests of the child
standard.
Prohibits a challenge
by one who waived
notice or who was
properly served with
notice.
Requires expeditious
processing of appeals.
Continues to allow
adult adoptee to vacate
the adoption.

WVLI language
adopted.

48-4-13 Adoption of
adults,

Adults may be adopted
with their consent with
the same effect; name

No change.

No change.

No change.

No change.

No change.

No change.

may also be changed.

48-4-14 Jurisdiction
of courts.

Concurrentjurisdiction
in circuit andjuvenile
courts.

48-4-15 Contracts
limiting or
restraining adoptions.

Contracts which limit
the right to petition for
adoption or which
attempt to alter the
provisions of this
chapter are void as
I against public policy

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
48-4-16 Prohibition of
purchase or sale of
child; penalty;
definitions;
exceptions.

B.

Criminalizes the
purchase or sale of
children as a felony;
Creates exceptions for:
reasonable and
customary agency fees
for services; reasonable
and customary legal,
medical, hospital or
other expenses
incurred in connection
with legal adoption
proceedings; surrogacy
contracts; fees
authorized by law or
the court relating to the
child's placement plan.

Adds a proviso that at
the final hearing an
affidavit of fees and
expenses paid or
promised by the
adoptive parents shall
be submitted to the
court; and that the
payments of pregnancy
and living expenses of
the birth mother shall
be itemized and
specifically approved
by the court before
they are expended.

[Vol. 102:1
Accepts the WVLI
proviso with regard to
affidavit of fees and
expenses paid or
promised to be
submitted at the final
hearing but deleted the
proviso with regard to
pre-approval of
expenses.
Replaces "in
connection with legal
adoption proceedings"
with "in connection
with the pregnancy,
birth and adoption
proceedings."

CurrentAdoption Procedure

An adoption proceeding is initiated by a petition that is to include all
information known about the child's parentage and property. 18' If consents or
relinquishments have been obtained, then they are attached to the petition. 82 If
consents or relinquishments have not been obtained, then grounds for termination
of parental rights are to be listed in the petition.' 83 If the father is unknown, then,
unless the birth mother is deceased, she must execute an affidavit detailing specific
information with regard to her circumstances around the conception and birth of the
child. 1 4 This affidavit is attached to the petition and is eventually sealed by the
court.' 85 The petition should also contain all of the child's available
medical and
8
social information, which is also eventually sealed in the court file.' 6
Despite the fact that putative fathers are included in the definition
section, 8 ' they are given neither the right to consent 83 nor receive notice." 9 Those
who must provide consent or otherwise have their rights terminated are: 1) all

181

See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-7(a)(l)-(3), (g) (1999).

182

See id. § 48-4-7(g).

183

See id. § 48-4-7(a)(4).

184

See id. § 48-4-7(b), (c).

185

See id. § 48-4-7(b), (d).

18

See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-7(f) (1999).

187

See id. § 48-4-1(m) ("'Putative father' means, before adoption, any man named by the mother as a

possible biological father of the child pursuant to the provisions of section seven [§ 48-4-7] of this article,
who is not a legal or determined father.").
188

See id. § 48-4-3(a).

189

See id. § 48-4-8(a).

WEST VIRGINIA 'SADOPTIONSTATUTE

1999]

mothers; 2) marital fathers; 3) outsider fathers who have been adjudicated as such
or whose paternity actions are pending; 4) determined fathers. 196 In a step-parent
adoption, the consent of the adoptive parent's spouse is not necessary, but it is
required that s/he join in the adoptive parent's petition. 191 The "determined father"
was defined more broadly to include not only those whose paternity was formally
adjudicated or acknowledged by affidavit, but also those with an action for
paternity establishment pending at the time that the adoption petition is filed.192
Consents may not be executed until seventy-two hours have passed after
the birth of the child.1 93 They must be signed and acknowledged before either a
judge, someone designated by the court to take consents, a notary public, a
commissioned military officer if the person signing the consent is in the military, or
of the foreign service if the person signing the consent is in another
an officer
1 94
country.
The consent or relinquishment must be in the signatory's primary
language.19 It must contain statutorily prescribed information about the child, the
person signing the consent, and the lawyers or agencies involved in the adoption, as
well as additional information attesting the signatory's understanding of the impact
of the adoption, the availability of counseling, and the Voluntary Adoption
Registry. 196 It may allow for conditional revocation19 and, if it does, instructions
must be provided as to how to revoke.198 The person signing the consent or
relinquishment must be provided with a copy.199
If consents cannot be obtained, then a hearing will be scheduled to
terminate the parental rights of those who have not consented. 20 The most common
theory upon which termination is pursued is abandonment. 0 1 The new statute uses
the Institute's language with regard to both the general292 and presumptive2 o0
190
See id. § 48-4-3(a). However, it is important to note an inconsistency in the statute regarding who
is required to consent. For further discussion of this inconsistency, see infra Part IV.A.
191
See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-3(b)(3) (1999).
192

See W. Va Code § 484-1 (h) (1999).

193

See Id. § 48-4-3a(a).

194

See id.§ 48-4-3a(b).

195

See id.§ 48-4-3b(a).

19

See id.

197

198

See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-3b(b) (1999).
See id.§ 484-3b(c)(3).

199

See id. § 48-4-3b(a)(13)(i).

200

See id. § 484-7(a)(4); see also infra Part IV.A.

201

See supraPart I.A.

202

See W. VA. CODE § 484-1 (a) (1999).

203

See id. § 48-4-3c.
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definitions of abandonment. The Legislature added one subsection of its own. If the
father is unknown, 2 4 he has presumptively abandoned his child if he "fails, prior to
the entry of the final adoption order, to make reasonable efforts to discover that a
pregnancy and birth have occurred as a result of his sexual intercourse with the
birth mother." 205
Since the statute's enactment, one case has been decided construing the
abandonment provisions of the statute. In In re Jeffries,20 p the court applied the
presumptive abandonment definition to find that a non-marital father had
abandoned his child by failing to provide any financial support and by failing to
visit with the child at any time during her life. The child was a year and a half old
at the time of the hearing to terminate the non-marital father's parental rights. 0 7
The court did not credit the father's excuse that he did not know where the child
was, given that he had been in contact with both the child's mother and the
adoptive family's attorney for significant periods of time and never approached any
of them about supporting or visiting the child. 208 The trial court's finding that the
father had not abandoned his child because he sought blood tests and established
paternity was reversed. 0 9 By the application of the presumption to the facts in this
case, the supreme court was clear that more than just legalistic maneuvering is
required to establish a protected parent-child relationship.
In addition to the question of consent, the adoption practitioner must be
aware of the notice requirements in the adoption statute. Unless notice of the
adoption has been waived, it must be served upon: 1) all those from whom consents
are required; 2) any person with adjudicated custody or visitation rights; 3) the
spouse of the petitioner if she or he has not joined in the petition; and 4) a
grandparent of the child if that grandparent's child is a deceased parent of the child
who had never executed a consent or relinquishment or otherwise had his or her
rights terminated.2 10 In addition, at any time during the proceedings, the court shall
order notice served upon anyone who should have been served earlier, but was not,
anyone who has revoked his or her consent, or any person who can provide relevant

204

The confusion caused by including unknown fathers in this abandonment section while requiring

only fathers who, by definition, would be known to provide consent is discussed further in Part III.B infra.
205
W. VA. CODE § 48-4-3c(c) (1999).
206

512 S.E.2d 873 (W. Va.1998).

207

See id. at 877. Because the adoptive couple waited over a year after the childfls placement to file

their petition for adoption, the child's father had time to have his patemity adjudicated, thereby making him a
determined father, entitled to be approached for consent under the statute. If the family had initiated and
resolved the petition prior to the paternity action, they would not have needed his consent. The implications

of this case for non-marital fathers will be discussed in greater detail in the forthcoming article in the West
Virginia Law Review's Spring Symposium issue, Family Law in the Year 2000. See 102 W. VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming Spring 2000).
208

See id. at 880.

209

See id.
at 881.

210

See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-8(a) (1999).
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information to the court that the court chooses to hear.2 "
If the father is unknown, the court will inspect the birth mother's affidavit,
determine whether additional evidence should be taken at a hearing, and finally
determine whether the father can be identified.21 This determination has to be
made at least sixty days before the final hearing on the adoption petition. 213 If the
father can be identified, then he should be served with notice.214 If he cannot be
identified, then the court must determine whether publication is likely to lead to
receipt of notice by him.2 15 If it is not, then the court may dispense with any further
efforts at notice.?
The methods to be used for serving notice vary depending upon whether
the person to be served is a resident or non-resident. Resident service is governed
by Rule 4 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. 217 For non-residents, a
hierarchy of preferred methods of service governs, requiring that each method be
tried, if possible, in descending order: 1) personal service; 2) registered or certified
mall, return receipt requested, to the person's last known address, with instructions
to forward; or 3) publication.218 If the person to be served is under a disability,
service must be made on him personally, as well as on his or her personal
representative or a guardian ad litem.219 Those served by publication have thirty
days to respond. 220
After the filing of the petition, a discreet inquiry will be conducted, unless
the court waives this requirement. 22 1 Typically, the court appoints an individual to
perform this inquiry shortly after the filing of the petition. The report must be ready
for the final hearing and should include at a minimum: 1) a description of the
adoptive family members, including their medical and employment histories; 2) a
physical description of the home and surroundings; 3) a description of the
adjustment of the child and family; 4) a report from the adoptive family's personal
references; and 5)- any other information the court deems necessary, which may
include a criminal background investigation of the adoptive family.'
After all issues concerning parental rights have been resolved, and the
211

See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-8(b) (1999).

212

See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-8b(a) (1999).

213

See id

214

See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-8b(b) (1999).

215

See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-8b(c) (1999).

216

See W. VA. CODE § 48.4-8b(c) (1999).

217

See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-Sa(a) (1999).

218

See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-8a(c) (1999).

219

See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-8a(d) (1999).

220

See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-Sa(e) (1999).

221

See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-9(b) (1999).

222

See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-9(b)(I)-(5) (1999).
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child has resided with the adoptive family for six months, the final hearing on the
adoption may take place. At this hearing, the court will receive the report from the
discreet inquiry and will consider evidence to determine whether the adoption is in
the child's best interest. Other facts that must be determined at this hearing include
whether the adoptive parents are fit to adopt the child, are of good moral character,
are of respectable standing in the community, and are able to properly, maintain
and care for the child.22 3 Finally, at the hearing, an affidavit of fees and expenses
paid or promised by the adoptive parents is also submitted to the court for its
approval.22 4
If the court is satisfied that the adoption is in the child's best interest and
that all of the requirements of the statute have been met, it will order the adoption.
With this order, the records of the adoption will be sealed and the prior legal status
of the birth parents extinguished, as the adoptive parents assume all of the rights
and responsibilities of parenthood for the adopted child. 22 5 The order may not
disclose the names or addresses of the birth parents. 2 6 The order is recorded, and
new birth certificates are issued, by the bureau of vital statistics to show that the
child was born to the adoptive parents.22 7
The adoption order is final for appeal purposes on the day that it is
issued,22 8 and all such appeals are to be heard expeditiously by the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals.22 The order becomes final for all other purposes when
the time for appeal has passed. 230 After the expiration of six months from the date
that the adoption is final, no challenge may be brought to the adoption for any
reason. 23 1 Challenges brought during the six-month period are subject to the clear
and convincing evidence standard, and it must be shown that vacating the adoption
would serve the best interest of the child.232 These challenges may only be brought
by persons who did not receive proper notice.233 Although an adoption may not be
set aside because of the adoptive parents' refusal to abide by an agreement for
visitation or communication, a petition for enforcement of such agreements may be
brought, and will be decided, using the best interest standard. 234
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IV. SURELY THIS CAN'T BE RIGHT: PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM DRAFTING INTHE
NOTICE AND CONSENT PROVISIONS OF WEST VIRGINIA'S 1997 ADOPTION STATUTE
As the Legislature wrangled over the parts of the Institute proposal it was
willing to accept and wrangled with each other to reconcile the differences between
the two houses, it is clear that more time was needed on the eve of the session to
reconcile the differences within the enrolled bill itself. In the end, the Legislature
wound up bestowing greater rights upon unknown fathers than some categories of
known non-marital fathers. The Legislature also created unnecessary redundancies
in the notice and consent provisions that can only serve to confuse.
A.

Inconsistencieson the CriticalIssue of Consent

As has been pointed out throughout this article, the legislature rejected the
Institute's proposal to include all birth parents in the consent provisions."
However, in the waning hours of the session that produced the statute, the
legislature failed to edit a portion of the statute which assumes that all birth parents
will need to provide consent or otherwise have their rights terminated.
Even though section 3 is explicit that the only nonmarital fathers who need
to be approached for consent are determined and outsider fathers, 236 section 6 of the
statute contradicts that legislative intent. Section 6 provides, in part,, that the
hearing on the petition may be had only after "all necessary consents or
relinquishments have been executed and submitted or the rights of all
nonconsenting birth parents have otherwise been terminated."2' 7 "Birth parents"
are defined as "both the biological father and the biologicai mother of the child."238
This provision, at the end of section 6, throws confusion into who must truly
provide consent. Even though section 3 would exclude many nonmarital fathers
from having to provide consent, section 6 won't allow the court to go forward
unless all birth fathers have their rights terminated, and the sentence certainly
implies that they should also be approached for consent before termination.
This contradiction undermines clarity on a critical issue and must be fixed.
The constitutionality of either interpretation will be discussed at length in my next
article.23
B.

Redundancies in the Notice andConsentProvisions
Under the current adoption statute, only legal, determined, and some
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outsider fathers are required to provide consent.24° A legal father is a man married
to the child's mother at the time of conception or birth. 24' A legal father may also
be a biological father who subsequently marries the mother prior to the adoption.242
Determined fathers are those in whom paternity has been adjudicated, either
formally or informally, as well as those who have paternity actions pending at the
time that the adoption is filed.243 Outsider fathers are those biological fathers of
children born to, or conceived by, the mother while she is married to another
man.244 Only those outsider fathers whose rights have been adjudicated or whose
cases are pending at the time of the adoption need be approached for consent.245
If a father does not fall into one of these three categories, the adoption may
proceed without his consent and without terminating his rights.246 Consent must be
obtained from all mothers, regardless of their marital status at the time of the
child's birth.247
The Legislature amended the general notice provision using the Institute
proposal as a working document. However, the changes that it made to the
Institute's proposal resulted in confusing redundancy. West Virginia Code section
48-4-8(a)(1) requires that notice be provided to anyone whose consent is required,
unless they have waived that right to notice or otherwise have had their parental
rights terminated. 48 As explained above, this provision would have required that
legal, determined, and outsider fathers also receive notice unless they have waived
that right or had their parental rights terminated. Subsection (a)(2) goes on to
require that the following group of fathers also receive notice: "[a]ny person whom
the petitioner knows is claiming to be the father of the child andwhose paternity of
the child has been established pursuant to the provisions of article six [section 48A6-1 et seq.] chapter forty-eight-a of this code.'(emphasis added).2 4 a This section
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fathers; 2) determined fathers; 3) outsider fathers whose rights had been adjudicated or whose cases were
pending at the time of the adoption; and 4) putative fathers. WVLI PROPOSAL, supra note 65 § 48-4-3(a).

[]Putative father[] was defined as the man or men named by the mother as the possible biological father of the
child in the affidavit of the birth mother attached to the petition. WVLI PROPOSAL, supranote 65 § 48-4-1(c).
This definition of putative father was adopted by the Legislature at W. VA. CODE § 48-4-1(m) (1999).
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See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-3(a)(1) and (3) (1999). The constitutionality of the ultimate notice and
consent provisions adopted by the Legislature will be considered in the author's article to be published in the
West Virginia Law Review Spring Symposium issue, Family Law inthe Year 2000.See 102 W. VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming Spring 2000).
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makes little sense. Any person whose paternity has been adjudicated pursuant to the
referenced article would be considered a determined father and would therefore be
entitled to notice under subsection (a)(1). This right to notice would exist without
regard to whether the petitioner knew of the determined father's claims of
paternity.
From this reporter's vantage point, it is easy to see how the Legislature
came to this confusing and unnecessary subsection. In the Institute's proposal, the
Institute required that notice be provided to those from whom consent was required,
using the same language as was ultimately reflected in the enrolled bill's subsection
(a)(1). However, under the Institute's proposal governing consent, this subsection
would have meant that putative fathers also would be included in the group of
fathers required to give consent and receive notice.2 0 Putative fathers referred to
named by the mother, who were neither legal nor determined
those fathers
251
fathers.
The Institute's proposed subsection(a)(2) required that the following set of
fathers also receive notice:
An individual whom the petitioner knows is claiming to be the
father of the minor adoptee and whose paternity has not been
established under Article 6 of this chapter, but notice need not be
executed a verified statement, as
served upon a man who has
25 2
described in section 48-4-3c;
The Institute believed that, with this subsection, it was being especially careful to
notice all possible fathers, even those whom the mother failed to name as putative
fathers, but whom the petitioner, for any reason, knew to be claiming paternity.
However, if these fathers had at any time denounced paternity in a written
statement, then they need not receive notice.
In the final drafting of this Act, it appears that the Legislature kept the first
half of the Institute's proposed language in subsection(a)(2), but ultimately changed
the second half requires formally establishing paternity establishment. The
Legislature was working off the Institute proposal but by editing it in this manner it
created a redundant provision.
The only other way that fathers, other than those legal, determined, or
outsider fathers, could receive notice, would be if at the time of the adoption, the
father had physical custody of the child. This method of entitlement to notice can
be discerned from subsection (a)(3), which allows for "[a]ny person other than the
petitioner who has legal or physical custody of the child or who has visitation rights
with the child under an existing court order issued by a court in this or another
state" may receive notice. Therefore, the only way that a putative father, i.e., a
father who is neither the legal nor determined father, would fall into this general
250
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category of individuals would be if he somehow came to have physical, as opposed
to legal, custody of the child. Any adjudicated custody or visitation rights would
have arisen as result of an adjudication of paternity, which would mean that he was
the determined father and entitled to notice and consent under subsection(a)(1) in
any event.
C.

Elevating the Unknown Father'sRights over Those of Other Non-Marital
Fathers

If the above was all that the Legislature had enacted with regard to nonmarital fathers, then, apart from some internal redundancies, the statute would
provide consistent and clear rules with regard to notice and consent. Those rules
could be distilled as follows: 1) only those non-marital fathers whose rights have
been or, in the case of "outsider fathers," are in the process of being adjudicated are
entitled to veto power in adoption; and 2) only one additional group of fathers is
entitled to notice, i.e., those non-marital fathers who have assumed responsibility
for the child through having physical custody of him or her at the time of the
adoption.
However, the general notice provision was not the only provision enacted
by the Legislature. The Legislature also addressed the problem of the unknown
father. As described in deiail in Part II above, the statute requires the birth mother
who claims that the father is unknown to submit an affidavit to the court, in which
she answers specific questions in the hopes of unearthing the identity of the
unknown father. 253 This affidavit makes sense in the context of the Institute's
proposal, in which a broader group of fathers were included in the notice and
consent provisions.
However, in the context of the Legislature's ultimate statute, the affidavit
would be far more to the point, and less intrusive into the mother's privacy, if she
were simply asked to reveal information that would go to the existence of legal, 5 4
determined 25 5 and outsider fathers, 2 ; as well as any men who
might have had
257
physical custody of the child prior to the adoption proceeding.
As it is now, the birth mother is asked information that has nothing to do
with identifying these categories of fathers. Instead, she is asked personal
information, irrelevant to those entitled to notice and consent under the statute as
enacted. For example, she is required to disclose whether she has informed any
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hospital personnel of the identity of the father," 3 whether she has named any man
as father on the birth certificate,25 9 and whether she was cohabiting with any man at
the probable time of conception. 260 All of these facts, while useful in determining
the identities of putative fathers, have little to do with discovering the identities of
those who are entitled to notice and consent under the current statute. Not only is
this affidavit unnecessarily intrusive into the lives of birth mothers, but it also
invades the privacy of the men whose names she must disclose in response to these
inquiries.
However, because the Legislature did adopt the Institute's complete
proposal with regard to unknown fathers, it turns out that unknown fathers, once
identified, are entitled to notice.6 1 While this end may at least justify asking all of
the questions of the birth mother discussed above, it also produces an anomalous
result. For example, if the unknown father turns out to be a mere putative father,
i.e. one who is neither a legal, determined or adjudicated outsider father, he now is
entitled to notice.
To consider a more specific example, assume that the birth mother
conceived the child while living with a man who was abusive. Once she becomes
pregnant, he becomes even more abusive. She determines that she will have to
leave him in order to preserve her own safety, as well as the safety of the child she
is carrying. Two years after the child is born, she marries another man. In two more
years, she joins her husband in petitioning for the child's adoption. The biological
father has never supported the child or visited the child. The birth mother initially
lists the child's father as unknown, but during the process of completing the
"unknown father" affidavit, she discloses the name of this man with whom she
cohabited. She is unable to offer a truthful explanation for why she contends he is
not the father. He now is entitled to notice, even though he has never been
adjudicated the child's father.
By contrast, assume that the birth mother lived peacefully with the child's
father during her pregnancy. During the pregnancy, the couple decide that they are
incompatible and that marriage for the sake of the child would be a mistake. After
the child's birth, the father moves out, but he continues to support the child
financially and visits frequently as well. Neither the mother nor the father ever
brought a paternity action because both were happy with the level of support, both
financial and emotional, that the father was able to provide. Eventually, the child's
mother marries, and the new couple, anxious to form a family unit, files a stepparent petition for adoption. The mother does not list the father as unknown. She
accurately states the facts known about the child's parentage. The child's father in
this case has no right to notice.
What is the operating principle that could justify the differences in
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treatment in these two hypothetical situations? The father in the first receives notice
because he evolved from an unknown putative father, into a known putative father.
The father in the second receives no notice because the mother was more willing to
be honest. While there may be a few justifications that could be offered here,262 the
truth is most likely that the Legislature adopted portions of the Institute proposal,
rejected others, and modified still more in a manner that lost sight of the need for a
coherent approach to the notice and consent question. If the Legislature chooses to
revisit the notice and consent provisions, a more complete consideration ought to
be given to integrating all of the various aspects of the statute with one another to
produce a more coherent approach to notice and consent.
This author's article to follow will explore more fully the constitutional
ramifications of the choices that the Legislature made with regard to the notice and
consent provisions of the statute. However, even without the constitutional
questions that may be implicated by the Legislature's approach, it is clear that
additional thought should be given to the treatment of the unknown father.
V. CONCLUSION

In the end, West Virginia did achieve the finality that it sought in
adoptions. However, the West Virginia Law Institute's goals of providing greater
protection to more categories of birth parents at the beginning of the process was
not accomplished. In the next installment of this close look at West Virginia
adoption law, the statute will be scrutinized further under the United States and
West Virginia constitutions.

262

One justification, unsatisfactory to this author, is that the provision is intended to be punitive, i.e.,

that when birth mothers hide the facts and their dishonesty is revealed, they should be forced to realize the

outcome they feared. Another closely related rationale might be to force greater counseling with birth mothers
before they declare a known father to be unknown. Perhaps if the birth mother in the first example had been
made aware of the consequences of being forthright as opposed to concealing the fathergs identity, she would
have disclosed his identity from the start. This would serve the purpose of ensuring that fewer fathers are
listed as unknown, thereby helping adoptive parents to rest more comfortably when the final adoption decree
is entered.

